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BOLDLY GOING WHERE NO LAW
HAS GONE BEFORE: CALL CENTRES,
INTAKE SCRIPTS, DATABASE FIELDS,
AND DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE©
LORNE SOSSIN*

This article focuses on the response of public law
to bureaucratic disentitlement. Whether eligibility
decisions for social welfare benefits are made on the
basis of a face to face interview or telephone intake
screening at a call centre, whether the questions are
onerous for vulnerable applicants to answer, whether the
bureaucratic hurdles can reasonably be surmounted or
lead to the de facto exclusion of otherwise eligible
applicants, all constitute questions which should be
fundamentally intertwined with the question of whether
a discretionary decision is legally valid. This is so not
only because service delivery models and administrative
design may determine the fairness, reasonableness, and
accuracy of a decision, but also because forms of
administration ought not to be inconsistent with our
fundamental values, such as human dignity. This article
advocates a more robust, public law response to the
welfare system than courts have been willing to
undertake, This approach requires that judges look
beyond the veil of public administration and ensure that
the rule of law reaches all spheres of public authority.
Changing the welfare system, however, ultimately
requires changing political and bureaucratic, as well as
legal, culture.

Cet article s'int6resse a la r6action du droit public
face aux pertes de droits suite A one decision
burcaucratique. Savoir si les d6cisions concernant
l'admissibilitd aux prestations de l'assistance sociale sont
prises sur la base d'une entrevue effectu6e face Aface ou
d'un entretien t6lephonique pr6alable de prise en charge
effectu6 dans on centre d'appel, si les questions pos6es
aux demandeurs vulndrables sont laborieuses, si les
embiches bureaucratiques peuvent raisonnablement Etre
surmont~es ou mnent A l'exclusion av6r6e de
demandeurs autrement admissibles, toutes ces questions
devraient fondamentalement s'entrecroiser avec celle de
savoir si une d6cision discr6tionnaire estvalable du point
de vuejuridique. 1len est ainsi non seulement parce que
les modules de prestation de services et la structure
administrative peuvent determiner le bien-fond6, le
caract~re raisonnable et la justesse d'une d6cision, mais
6galement parce que les formes d'administration ne
devraient pas contredire nos valeurs fondamentales,
telles que la dignit6 humaine.
Cet article pr6conise une r6action plus marqu6e du
droit public envers le systme de l'aide sociale que celle
volontiers adopt~c par les tribunaux. Cette d~marche
demande aux juges de soulever le voile de
l'administration publique et de s'assurer que l'6tat de
droit atteint toutes les spheres des pouvoirs publics. Mais
pour changer le syst~me de l'aide sociale, il faut somme
toute changer la culture politique et la culture
bureaucratique, tout autant que la culture juridique.
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INTRODUCTION

Social assistance is a matter of law. Benefit levels and eligibility
criteria are set out in statutes and regulations and elaborated for decisionmakers in administrative guidelines and manuals.' Social assistance is also
a matter of discretion. Discretion is typically understood in the legal sense
of statutory grants of authority in which the decision maker is provided with
a choice as to the decision at hand. For example, many social assistance
statutes authorize caseworkers to provide emergency assistance where
circumstances warrant. Discretion is also sometimes understood in the
interpretive sense. Social assistance statutes often provide for a series of
benefits once a "disability" is established but the precise meaning of this
term is left to be worked out through administrative interpretation and
I While social assistance eligibility criteria may be found in statutes, regulations, policy guidelines
and manuals, these are not all treated similarly under Canadian public law. Statutes and regulations are
considered "law" and therefore held to bind discretionary decision makers while guidelines are
considered "policy" and therefore held to be non-binding. Elsewhere, this distinction has been argued
to be both difficult to sustain and undesirable, particularly in the social welfare context. For discussion,
see Laura Pottie & Lorne Sossin, "Demystifying the Boundaries of Public Law: Policy, Discretion and
Social Welfare" (2003) [unpublished, on file with author].
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judicial review. In this article, I focus on a third level of discretion, one
concerned with administrative design. This level of discretion, I contend, is
most often responsible for the phenomenon of bureaucratic disentitlement
and is too often ignored in public law circles.
How one applies for benefits, how decisions on eligibility are
reached, the training and qualifications of decision makers, the degree of
personal contact with applicants, the nature and kind of documents which
must be produced and verified, and so forth, each has a profound effect on
applicants and recipients. But should government be legally accountable in
some way for these choices? Must these administrative choices, as a matter
of law, lead to fair, equitable, reasonable, and just administrative designs
or may they be driven simply by cost savings, efficiency or political
concerns? These are the questions I seek to address in this article.
The welfare system is often described as an "expert system." Its
design and operation are often opaque and confusing for applicants. It is
also often said that in such settings, front-line decision makers are the
policy makers.2 Policy and administration are indistinguishable because
these decision makers deal with a high volume of cases, with few
opportunities for supervision, and must adapt general and abstract rules to
the complex, personal circumstances of applicants. While the boundary
between policy making and public administration is widely recognized as
porous, the boundary between public law and public administration, as I
elaborate below, has proven more resilient. Indeed, where public
administration begins, it often appears that public law ends. In my view, a
re-examination of the extent to which this distinction is tenable or desirable
is long overdue.
Whether the eligibility decision is made on the basis of a face-toface interview or telephone intake screening, whether the questions are
onerous for vulnerable applicants to answer, whether the bureaucratic
hurdles can reasonably be surmounted or lead to the de facto
disentitlement of otherwise eligible applicants for social assistance, all
constitute questions which are, in my view, fundamentally intertwined with
the question of whether a discretionary decision is legally valid. This is so
not only because forms of administration may determine the fairness,
reasonableness, and accuracy of the decision, but also because forms of
administration must live up to our fundamental values-what Jerry Mashaw
2 The classic studies of this phenomenon are Michael Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy:Dilemmas
of The Individualin Public Services (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980) [Lipsky, Street Level
Bureaucracy] and Jeffrey Manditch Prottas, People Processing: The Street Level Bureaucrat in Public
Bureaucracies(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1979). For a Canadian perspective, see Greg McEtligott,
Beyond Service: State Workers, Public Policy and the Prospectsfor DemocraticAdministration (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002).
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terms the "dignitary appropriateness" of an administrative system.3 I argue
that public law's concern for accountability in how public authority is
wielded should be extended to the administrative domains that have been
the most impervious to legal scrutiny. Where discretionary authority is the
broadest and the parties affected the most vulnerable, such as in social
assistance settings, the importance of legal accountability-indeed, of any
kind of accountability-is particularly acute.
I argue that theform of public administration shapes and constrains
the scope of legal discretion just as often, and just as importantly, as do
guidelines, regulations, or statutes that determine the substance of
eligibility for benefits. As I elaborate below, I would question whether form
and substance can be disentangled at all in the discretionary settings of
social assistance. If you are concerned about evaluating whether a
discretionary decision was fairly reached, whether it was reasonable and
within the authority of the decision maker-if you are interested, in other
words, in the traditional concerns of discretionary justice in administrative
law-you must look just as carefully at the intake call centre scripts as the
policy guidelines; similarly, the database software used by the intake
officers is as relevant as the Regulations issued by Cabinet. For example,
if intake for a disability benefit is taken only over the phone with
inadequate accommodation for the fact that many applicants will lack the
ability to complete an application over the phone, then the form of
administration has determined the substance of the decision. The person
left holding the phone with unintelligible questions or a busy signal on the
other end will have been alienated from the decision-making process, and
bureaucratically disentitled to benefits that she is legally due. As it stands
now, though, there is practically no legal recourse available to this person
(nor recourse of any other kind). This situation is, in my view, unacceptable.
Where service delivery models have as much influence on decision
making as substantive eligibility criteria, duties of procedural fairness and
reasonableness amount to half measures if applied to the latter but not to
the former. This is not to suggest that cost considerations and managerial
philosophies of particular governments are irrelevant or that judges should
be invited to micromanage the operation of welfare offices. My view,
simply, is that discretionary justice (understood at its simplest in the
negative-as minimizing injustice from the exercise of discretionary

Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (New Haven: Yale University
Press,
1985) c. 6.
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authority)4 requires that forms of public administration be subject to
minimum standards of fairness and reasonableness.
This analysis of these arguments will be divided into three sections.
In Part II, I describe the administrative setting of social assistance
determinations, using the recent restructuring of social assistance delivery
in Ontario as a case study. In Part III, I examine the extent to which, and
the basis on which, the administrative system of service delivery ought to be
subject to public law requirements of procedural fairness and
reasonableness. Finally, in Part IV, I consider the recent trend toward
privatization of welfare administration in the United States and the
additional complexities of legal accountability that result. I conclude this
section with a consideration of the principles on which a legal response to
bureaucratic disentitlement should be founded, and how those principles
might be put into practice.
I advocate a more robust, public law response to the welfare system
than courts have been willing to undertake. This approach requires that
judges look beyond the veil of public administration and ensure that the
rule of law reaches all spheres of public authority. This is not intended,
however, simply as a plea for expanding the judicial role or the role of
litigation in securing welfare rights. Judicial recognition of the legal
obligations owed by governments in the design of welfare systems can act
as a catalyst for administrative reform, and may open other avenues for
redress to those applicants and recipients who have been denied benefits to
which they were due. Nevertheless, changing the welfare system ultimately
requires changing political and bureaucratic as well as legal culture.
II.

WELFARE'S SERVICE DELIVERY MODEL IN ONTARIO:
DISENTITLEMENT BY BUREAUCRACY

The central proposition I wish to advance in this paper is that public
law cannot and should not be divorced from the administrative mechanisms
used to achieve policy ends. My analysis will focus on the Ontario
experience and the shift in service delivery model undertaken as part of the
provincial government's restructuring of welfare in the late 1990s. In 1997,
Ontario enacted the OntarioWorks Act 5 and the OntarioDisabilitySupport

4

See Kenneth Culp Davis, DiscretionaryJustice:A PreliminaryInquiry (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1969). Davis wrote, "Where law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise of
discretion may mean either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or injustice, either reasonableness or
arbitrariness" (at 3).
S.O. 1997, c. 25, Sch. A [owA].
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ProgramAct (ODSPA)6 to replace earlier statutes providing general social
assistance.7 Under the new scheme, individuals without a disability are

required, in order to receive social assistance, to participate in workfare
(which mostly consists of job training). Those individuals with a sufficiently
substantial disability are not required to participate in workfare. While

many aspects of the welfare system are discretionary, both in terms of
eligibility and benefits,8 one of the most contentious areas of discretion lies
in the determination of who has a disability and who does not.

The Ontario Government's restructuring sought not only to change
the norms underlying social assistance from entitlement-based to contract-

based, and to more starkly distinguish the deserving poor (ie. those unable
to work in the market) from the undeserving poor (ie. those able to work
in the market but unsuccessful in doing so), but also to reduce the

Government's outlays on welfare more generally. That reducing
expenditures on welfare is a policy priority of most governments in Canada
is not a controversial observation. The reasons why many governments seek
to reduce the number of welfare recipients and the level of their benefits
are both obvious and subtle. The obvious benefits include reducing public
expenditures in a time of fiscal restraint and, in some cases, obtaining
political capital by getting "tough" on welfare. The more subtle benefits
include support for low-wage industries by providing a ready source of
inexpensive and available labour, winning the "race to the bottom" against
other jurisdictions so as not to become a haven for social assistance
recipient migrants, and reinforcing moral norms which value independence
and self-sufficiency as the hallmarks of citizenship. This last motivation is,
in turn, bound up with complex gender stereotypes that underpin the social

6 S.O. 1997, c. 25, Sch. B [ODSPA].
7 For a description of the new legislation and the scheme it replaced, see Ian Morrison,
"Ontario
Works: A Preliminary Assessment" (1998) 13 J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 1; and Harry Beatty, "Ontario Disability
Support Plan: Policy and Implementation" (1999) 14 J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 1.
8 The question as to whether social assistance benefits are purely discretionary is not a simple one.
Section 7 of the OWA, supra note 4, for example, states that "Income assistance shall be provided in
accordance with the regulations to persons who satisfy all conditions of eligibility under this Act and the
regulations" [emphasis added]. This suggests social assistance is a mandatory rather than discretionary
benefit. However, the Regulations provide for a series of discretionary determinations which can result
in ineligibility. To take just one example, s.11(1) provides that, "If the Director is not satisfied that a
member of a benefit unit is making reasonable efforts to obtain compensation or realize a financial
resource or income that the person may be entitled to or eligible for, the Director may determine that
the person is not eligible for income support.... (0. Reg. 222/98). The Act also requires as a condition
of eligibility the production of specified documents (s.7(3)(c))--however, how a document is verified
is left to the discretion of officials.
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assistance system. 9
One way to achieve these goals is simply to cut or eliminate social
assistance benefits. Another way is to attach conditions to the receipt of
assistance (for example workfare) or to restrict the categories of eligibilities.
All of these policies are at least somewhat transparent and require some
form of public justification (depending on whether they are initiated by
statute, regulation, or guideline). Creating an onerous, even labyrinthine
administrative process, in contrast, serves to advance these same purposes
through bureaucratic disentitlement. When a government cuts benefits, it
must do so transparently and must defend such choices to the electorate.
When governments alter administrative designs, by contrast, this occurs
largely without public input or scrutiny and with little or no recourse for
those adversely affected by such changes. It is considered a matter of
technological or bureaucratic restructuring, or in the inelegant words of the
Ontario Government in the late 1990s, a "Business Transformation

Project" (BTP).
For some time now, governments in the United States and Canada
have waged an active campaign to move people from welfare to work, or
more colourfully, "to end welfare as we know it." Reductions in eligibility
coverage and benefit levels have been an important plank in this policy and
often have been undertaken through policy initiatives. Restructuring
"service delivery" permits numbers of recipients to be reduced since fewer
will be capable of navigating their way through the application process,
while those that do will have to fulfill precisely the kind of rigorous
performance of contractual obligations which upholds market values. It also
ensures that the receipt of social assistance is not a pleasant or affirming
experience and reinforces the stigma associated with recipients' perceived
failure in the market. When the Conservative Party won the 1995 election
in Ontario, their first policy initiative was to reduce welfare benefits for
most recipients by 21.6 per cent. Shortly thereafter, as indicated above,
workfare was instituted in Ontario and able-bodied recipients were required
to undertake job training, community service, or specified employment as

9 The relationship between social assistance and gender is rooted in the moral regulation of
single
mothers in particular. See, for example, Margaret Jane Hillyard Little, No Car,No Radio, No Liquor
Permit.The MoralRegulationofSingle Mothers in Ontario,1920-1997 (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
1998); Margaret Hillyard Little & Ian Morrison, "'The Pecker Detectors are Back': Regulation of the
family form in Ontario welfare policy" (1999) 34:2 J. Canadian Studies 110; Janet Mosher, "Managing
the Disentitlement of Women: Glorified Markets, the Idealized Family, and the Undeserving Others"
in Sheila M. Neysmith, ed., RestructuringCaringLabour: Discourse, State Practice,and Everyday Life
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000) 30; Patricia Evans, "Single Mothers and Ontario's Welfare
Policy: Restructuring the Debate" in Janine Brodie, ed., Women andCanadianPublic Policy (Toronto:
Harcourt Brace & Company, 1996) 151.
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a condition of receipt of benefits. 0 These policy shifts attracted widespread
attention." The litigation which followed this policy initiative confirmed
that the courts were not prepared to reverse such express policy
preferences, either under the Charter2 or on administrative law doctrines
such as legitimate expectations, the rule of law, or procedural fairness. 3
By comparison to such policy initiatives, very little attention has
been paid to the welfare system-to the process by which government
determines eligibility for social benefits-which also underwent a seachange at the same time. 4 While there is much that is new about the
changes to the welfare system discussed below, it is important to situate
welfare administration against a broader backdrop. The administration of
welfare has never been a value-free or neutral phenomenon. Like the policy
differentiation of those who are indigent by reason of work-related injuries
from those born disabled, and the differentiation of those who are indigent
by reason of losing a job from those who never bothered to look for one,
the welfare system also represents a moral and ideological order, separating
and demarcating the "deserving" from the "undeserving" poor. Today's
system of poverty relief is not far removed from the poorhouses of England
where, as Joel Handler writes, "administration
was accomplished through
15
the deliberate use of moral degradation.'
The link between welfare administration and moral regulation has
See Morrison, supra note 7.
See Maeve Quaid, Workfare: Why Good Social Policy Ideas Go Bad (Toronto:
University of
Toronto Press, 2002); Jamie Peck, Workfare States (New York: Guilford Press, 2001) c. 6.
12 CanadianCharterof Rights andFreedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
13 See Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services) (1996), 134 D.L.R.
(4th) 20
(Ont. Div. Ct.) (leave to appeal to the Ont. C.A. refused). For a general discussion of the limits of law
in social policy settings, see David J. Mullan, "The Role of the Judiciary in the Review of Administrative
Policy Decisions: Issues of Legality" in Mary Jane Mossman & Ghislain Otis, eds., The Judiciaryas Third
Branch of Government: Manifestationsand Challenges to Legitimacy (Montreal: Les Editions Th~mis,
2000) 313.
14 This may be about to change as advocacy groups highlight the unfairness of the application
process for social benefits. See John Fraser, Cynthia Wilkey & JoAnne Frencshkowski, "Denial by
Design ...
the Ontario Disabiliy Support Program" (Toronto: Income Security Advocacy Centre, 2003),
online: <http:/www.incomesecurity.org/index_1 .html >; Dean Herd & Andrew Mitchell, "Discouraged,
Diverted and Disentitled: Ontario Works New Service Delivery Model" (Toronto: Community and
Social Planning Council of Toronto, 2002) at 7, online: < http://www.socialplanningtoronto.org/CSPCT%20Reports/Discouraged.pdf>.
Joel F. Handler, "'Constructing the Political Spectacle': Interpretation
of Entitlements,
Legalization and Obligations in Social Welfare History" (1990) 56 Brook. L. Rev. 899. See also Frances
Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1971).
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become more subtle but remains an animating principle of administrative
reform in the sphere of social assistance. This may be illustrated by
returning to the example of the BTP. In February 1997, the Ontario Ministry
of Community and Social Services entered into a contract with Andersen
Consulting (now Accenture) to design and implement this project. The
project included design of a new computer system; this new technology,
which linked all the welfare delivery sites in the province, was intended to
decrease error and fraud. The project resulted in the introduction of new
management practices and a new Service Delivery Model (SDM) for social
assistance, which became operational in January 2000.
The point of the new SDM was to modernize the delivery of social
assistance benefits and to save money. The SDM could save money in two
ways-reducing the personnel costs associated with welfare through
increased reliance on technology, or reducing the costs associated with
welfare by reducing the welfare rolls (ostensibly by eliminating error and
fraud). 6 Underlying the logic of saving money through changing the system
by which welfare is administered in order to reduce the number of people
on welfare is also the logic of bureaucratic disentitlement.
Matthew Diller explains the process of bureaucratic disentitlement
in accomplishing welfare reductions in the following terms:
Policymakers, however, can accomplish the same end without changing a single eligibility
condition or requirement by making administrative adjustments which have the same effect.
For example, they could simply open the welfare centers an hour later each morning and
close them an hour earlier. They could relocate centers from poor neighbourhoods to central
downtown locations. They could multiply the number of appointments necessary to establish
eligibility. Carrying this logic further, officials could increase the amount of time applicants
must wait for appointments, remove some of the chairs from the waiting room, add pages to
the application form, reduce the number and variety of foreign language interpreters, and
so forth. 7

16

,
Sanford Borins, in his appraisal of the Business Transformation Project, observed: "In February
1999, Hession [the project manager] and HLB [a risk analyst firm hired to appraise the Business
Transformation Project] reported, based on their statistical analysis of the program, that BTP would
likely yield $347 million in benefits, a return of 222 per cent on the original investment. The benefits
would arise from productivity gains in the administration of OWP and ODSP as well as more accuracy
in making payments to recipients." See "New Information Technology and the Public Sector in Ontario"
(Research Paper Series No. 12, Report to the Panel on the Role of Government, June 2003) at 45,
online: Bora Laskin Law Library <http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/investing/reports/rpl2.pdf>. The
Accenture contract sparked a new controversy in the summer of 2004 when it was announced that the
computer system could not process a 3 per cent rise in benefit rates without a substantial delay. See
Richard Brennan & Robert Benzie, "670,000 welfare, disability recipients can't get 3% hike" Toronto
Star (6 July 2004) Al.
Mathew Diller, "The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion
and
Entrepreneurial Government" (2000) 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1121 at 1131.
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Sheri Danz describes bureaucratic disentitlement as "effectuated

through such practices as withholding information, providing
misinformation, isolating applicants and requiring extraordinary amounts
of documentation," every one of which "prevents the transformation of
statutory rights into tangible benefits.' 18 Bureaucratic disentitlement may
reflect a deliberate political or institutional policy or it may simply be the
result of too few resources, too little training, or too little attention. Most
often, it involves a little of all of the above.
Disentitlement is not always a clear-cut experience of losing or
failing to obtain benefits. It is often the accumulation of subtle, difficult to
pinpoint "discouragement practices. ' 9 For one applicant, it might be the

physical location of a welfare office, for another it might be the inability of
welfare officials to cope with demand, leading to long lines, frayed nerves
and exhausted staff and applicants, while for still another any one of these
could be overcome but together they represent a simply insurmountable

barrier. As Mashaw observes,
Kafkaesque procedures take away the participants' ability to engage in rational planning
about their situation, to make informed choices among options. The process 2implicitly defines
the participants as objects, subject to infinite manipulation by the system. 0

A number of bureaucratic disentitlement strategies have been
associated with the BTP and the new SDM implemented in Ontario since
1997. These include: centralized "one size fits all" administrative process
that is complex and inflexible; failing to assist applicants with the process;
staff relations characterized by poor training and high turnover; and

creating new steps and steps within steps that claimants must surmount

18

Sheri M. Danz, "A Nonpublic Forum or a Brutal Bureaucracy? Advocacy Claims of Access to

Welfare Centre Waiting Rooms" (2000) 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1004 at 1006 [footnote omitted]. See also
Anna Lou Dehavenon, "Charles Dickens Meets Franz Kafka: The Maladministration of New York
City's Public Assistance Programs" (1989-90) 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 231 at 233 (describing
an "enormous and byzantine" bureaucracy and a "mind-boggling" array of rules) [footnotes omitted].
The term "bureaucratic disentitlement" was popularized in Michael Lipsky, "Bureaucratic
Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs" (1984) 58 Soc. Serv. Rev. 3.
19 This term is borrowed from Susan D. Bennett, "'No relief but upon the terms of coming
into
the house'-Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an Urban Shelter
System" (1995) 104 Yale L.J. 2157 at 2164.
20 Mashaw, supra note 3 at 175-76. Mashaw also observed that Kafka gained many of his
impressions of administrative processes as a bureaucrat in an agency dispensing disability benefits. See
BureaucraticJustice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1983) at 91, n. 9.
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before becoming eligible for benefits. 2 The new SDM confronts claimants
with a daunting and onerous two-stage application process (which involves
a first stage telephone intake screening, a second stage face-to-face followup interview, each with significant information and documentation
requirements), an ineffectual but time-consuming internal reconsideration
process, and further delay, cost, and procedural uncertainty if a denial is
appealed to the Social Benefits Tribunal. I will discuss each of these stages
of the administrative process, highlighting the important structuring of
discretion that is accomplished by administrative mechanisms and practices
and which, as discussed below, is usually seen as beyond the scope of legal
accountability.
A.

Intake Screening

Ontario's new SDM added a preliminary screening stage to the
welfare process prior to the interview with an intake official to decide the
question of eligibility for benefits, whether under Ontario Works (ow) or
Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP). This preliminary screening
process involves intake officials operating out of call centres fielding initial
inquiries from welfare applicants.22 This intake process determines whether
the applicants can move on to the second stage in-person interview to
determine welfare eligibility. 23 There are several dynamics of the screening
process that create barriers or obstacles to claimants and therefore
contribute to the ethos of disentitlement: (1) the call centre; (2) the
interactive voice response; (3) the scripts; (4) the screening; and (5) the
discretion.
1.

The Call Centre

Most of what I characterize as bureaucratic disentitlement occurs
at the first stage of the application process and results in applicants who
might otherwise have met the eligibility criteria simply giving up and
withdrawing. In order to obtain welfare benefits in Ontario, applicants must
begin by phoning an intake official located at a call centre (the closest call
21 See Herd & Mitchell, supra note 14 at 26-34. These strategies are not new-see the similar

catalogue of disentitlement strategies discussed in Lipsky, Street LevelBureaucracy,supra note 2 at 8-31.
22
Seven regional call centres have been established as Intake Screening Units (Isus) for the entire
province.
23 Intake officials can reject applicants if they have income or assets in excess of legislated limits,
live with their parents or are not financially independent, have a past record of Ontario Works fraud,
are incarcerated, are in receipt of a student loan or reside outside of Ontario.
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centre is determined by reference to the applicant's postal code). The
requirement to begin the application process in this fashion gives rise to a
number of discouragement practices.
First, a telephone application removes the face-to-face interaction
and renders the client nothing more than an anonymous voice on an
earpiece. It is much easier for the intake screener to simply follow the script
and move on to the next call. This can only be exacerbated with the length
of time an intake screener spends in the call centre environment. It is likely
much easier for intake officials to reject applicants or impose additional
documentary requirements over the telephone than it would be if those
same applicants were standing in front of them. This depersonalization of
applicants combined with screener apathy clearly facilitates restrictive
discretion.
Second, call centre work environments are generally quantityrather than quality-oriented. In other words, call center operators are
usually given time-per-call targets and number-of-call quotas. These
numbers are usually monitored on an employee-by-employee basis, and
employees know that they are being assessed against these criteria. In this
environment, intake screeners would not feel free to extend time with any
one applicant, and applicants would be less likely to obtain assistance
appropriate to their particular situation.
Third, calls are usually recorded, either randomly or entirely. While
this can work to protect an applicant by discouraging the provision of
inappropriate information (however that is defined by management), it can
also work against them. An applicant whose call is being recorded will feel
less comfortable in speaking "off the record" to receive confidential
information or advice from someone who works in the system. The intake
screener will be similarly reluctant; where the intake screener is on the one
hand aware that their calls are being monitored, and on the other hand
aware of the political and administrative climate (not to mention the stated
objective2 4) of limiting the number of applications that proceed to an
Internal Review, there will be an obvious aversion to helping applicants
"too much." In other words, the intake screener will be less likely to
''encourage" an applicant to file an objection to the screener's conclusion,
for instance, or to provide moral support to an applicant.
The effect of dehumanizing applicants and exerting employment
stresses to limit intake screeners' incentives to exercise expansive discretion
24 The official job requirement for the Intake Screener states: "Clearly communicates with
applicant any reason for ineligibility with enough detail to minimize the likelihood of an Internal
Review." Taken from: Algoma District Services Administration Board, "Intake Screener (Equivalent
to Case Manager -Reports to isu Supervisor)," package 1, p. 1 [on file with author].
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is significant. Herd and Mitchell make this point when they state that
the process of applying has been made much more complicated, and contains process pitfalls
that can improperly render a person ineligible. The extent to which it does so depends on the
interests and efforts of delivery agents to counteract the built-in biases toward diverting
people which were the province's intention.

Minimizing the likelihood that intake screeners will be interested
in using the tools available to them to "work the system" in a client's favour
is a crucial element in actualizing an agenda to reduce the number of social
assistance clients.
The effect of the use of call centres (whether or not it is the intent)
is to create obstacles, barriers, and disincentives for potential applicants.2 6
Even accessing the call centres requires overcoming challenges. Herd and
Mitchell report that participants in their study of the intake process had
problems getting through to the call centres. Some participants had to call
10-15 times before getting through, while others had to call back repeatedly
to have straightforward questions answered.2 7
2.

Interactive Voice Response

The inability to contact workers or to get a satisfactory response to
requests for assistance when attempting to leave messages for intake
officials on the "Interactive Voice Response" system is a frustration for
many but may create personal crises for others.28 Interactive Voice
Response involves calling into a number and being routed by a
computerized voice to a series of pre-recorded messages. The system, which
requires individuals to "press 1, 2 or 3" depending on their inquiry, is not
suitable for situations that cannot be reduced to a standard enquiry.
Recipients cannot ask the automated system a question or talk to a
caseworker.2 9 According to Herd and Mitchell, this automated system,
which is allegedly more efficient than even "live" telephone conversations,
is also part of "a larger process of de-personalizing social assistance:
25 Herd & Mitchell, supra note 14 at 15.
26 It should be emphasized that the use of call centres is not inherently alienating. For a study of
how to integrate call centres in meeting client needs in social benefits settings, see U.K., House of
Commons Committee of Public Accounts, Better public service through call centres (Twentieth Report
of Session 2002-03, HC 373) (London: The Stationery Office, 2003) at 9-13, online:
<http://www.publications.partiament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmpubacc/373/373.pdf>.
27 Herd & Mitchell, supra note 14 at 23.
28
29

Ibid. at 27-29.
Ibid. at 51.
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distancing recipients from access to support and in the process isolating and
marginalising them more."3 Certainly, one of the implications of the
interactive voice response is to exacerbate linguistic, technological, and
cultural barriers that vulnerable people may face in seeking to access the
welfare system.
3.

The Scripts

When an applicant does reach an intake official at the call centre,
the official must read a series of questions from a "script,, 31 and record the
answers in database fields. The scripts effectively simplify the complicated
reality of each claimant's situation into a series of "inputs" into the system.
A legal clinic caseworker was told by the call centre that the telephone
screening process could not be bypassed, even for a schizophrenic claimant
with a comprehension problem. Further, the call centre was not able to
handle an "I don't know" response to any of the questions posed. The same
legal clinic caseworker was told that it was not acceptable to provide the
information requested at the face-to-face eligibility meeting; the application
could not proceed unless the screener was given a number to enter into the
system.
4.

The Screening

According to the "Denial by Design" report prepared by the
Income Security Advocacy Centre on the application process for ODSP
benefits, the Intake Screening Unit (ISU) telephone interview generally
takes between forty minutes and an hour to complete.3 2 The authors note
that access to telephones is a barrier in itself for some groups such as the
homeless (and a significant number of low income people who, even if
housed, lack telephones), while for others, especially those with cognitive
impairments, the risk of misunderstanding the meaning or significance of
questions is high and many individuals simply lack the capacity to complete
30

Ibid. at 52.
Scripts serve multiple functions which clearly restrict expansive discretion.
By demanding a
certain level of information, they limit the intake screener's ability to waive information requirements
where it would be inappropriate, and expand the means by which an applicant may be turned away
without receiving assistance. Conversely, by limiting the amount of information that an intake screener
may ask of an applicant, scripts restrict an intake screener's ability to gather information that may fall
outside the script but is nevertheless relevant to the application. By limiting the information an intake
screener may provide to an applicant, scripts also restrict the intake screener's ability to communicate.
32 Firaser, Wiley & Frencshkowski, supra note 14 at 7.
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the process. While Isu officials may refer applicants to in-person interviews,
the applicants must still manage to interact on the phone to initiate the
process by which these referrals are made. As one claimant stated:
If you have any kind of special needs, or your situation isn't exactly cut and dry, like black and
white, you are automatically told you are not eligible.... A lot of people don't have ... the
confidence to call the office directly and make the complaint. They just kinda give up."

A caseworker participating in the Herd and Mitchell study reported:
[My client] would have given up many times during the process if she had called the centre
on her own.... I also feel that the call centre would have told her she wasn't eligible because
she did not have the information needed to apply. On top of this they would have given her
wrong advice ... .'

The Denial by Design report also found that the skills, background
and judgment of particular ISU officials varied widely. An internal
government study disclosed that some officials have made findings of
"ineligibility" but recorded "applicant chose to discontinue" in the official
file, thereby extinguishing appeal rights. The training given to ISU officials
varies but often is minimal. One official indicated that it is not uncommon
in Toronto for administrative assistants to moonlight as part-time intake
officials with no social work or caseworker training.3 5
Even a "conclusion" of ineligibility is not a final determination in
the new process, but can lead applicants to believe mistakenly that a
decision has been made. The process of lodging an "objection" to the
"finding of ineligibility" is complicated and must be followed precisely,
otherwise it will become a "decision" that cannot be appealed. An example
of confusing language in a sample letter: "A conclusion cannot be appealed.
However ifyou disagree with this conclusion of ineligibility, you may submit
a formal objection."36 Another example of confusing language occurs in the
letter an applicant receives if their objection is unsuccessful: "If you
disagree with the results of the internal review, you may appeal the decision
to the Social Benefits Tribunal within thirty days of the date when the

34

Herd & Mitchell, supra note 14 at
24.
Ibid. at 25.

Interview of former Toronto-area welfare caseworker (March 2003).
36 Taken from North Intake Screening Unit, Nipissing District Social Services Administration
Board, Algoma District Services Administration Board, Example conclusion of ineligibility letter, dated
January 12 2001, package 12 at 1 [on file with author].
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internal review should have been completed." "
Despite this highly confusing screening process, a review of the new
intake screening units in 2001 indicated that provincial efficiency targets
were not being realized. A lower-than-anticipated percentage of applicants
was being found ineligible at the initial, telephone-intake stage. One of the
suggested strategies for increasing efficiency included instructing screeners
to make conclusions of ineligibility "for as many applicants as possible" and
to exercise greater discretion in finding people ineligible whose income and
assets fall within 15 per cent of the allowable limit.3 8 In other words, one of
the most effective disentitlement mechanisms is to withhold the benefit of
the doubt from applicants.
The point of the Isu stage of the application process is not merely
to reduce the number of welfare recipients; arguably, it is also intended to
limit and structure the discretion officials wield over the intake process.
This is done by subtle means-the intake scripts, the mandatory database
fields, et cetera-as well as by more direct measures such as the ineligibility
within the 15 per cent guideline mentioned above. Whatever the form, all
have the effect of limiting the ambit of the intake official's judgments in
relation to eligibility. Gradually, a discretionary power to determine
eligibility becomes reduced to a series of isolated and fragmented pieces of
an equation that intake screeners with little training and few qualifications
are expected simply to calculate. The most significant discretion that is left
to these screeners is the authority to defer an application to an in-person
interview when the circumstances of an application make it inappropriate
to screen through a telephone call.
5.

The Discretionary Use of In-Person Interviews

The exercise of this discretion is not a straightforward process. In
order to coordinate the activities of the ISus and the local offices, a vast
array of protocols and policies have been established. These protocols limit
expansive discretionary decision making in a number of ways, not the least
of which is by creating a separation between the workers who agree to
certain procedures, and the workers who perform them. For instance, a
local office can and does conduct "off-site verification interviews" for those
who are unable to attend an interview at a local office (typically, this might
occur where an applicant is in hospital). It is the intake screener, however,

37Taken from "Letter: Outcome of Internal Review-Appealable Letter; Letter
#4 (user),"
package 1 at 3 [on file with author].
38
Ibid. at 19-20.
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not the local office, that schedules interviews, and thus a protocol sets
precise criteria for when a client will be granted an off-site interview. 39 This
necessarily precludes a discretionary decision to expand these
circumstances where appropriate. Where local offices or individual workers
schedule their own interviews, they may be able to take advantage of their
own circumstances (for instance a last-minute cancellation, or some other
scheduling opportunity) to provide an off-site interview to a client who
perhaps does not meet the precise policy criteria for an off-site interview,
but needs it nevertheless. This possibility becomes important given the
restrictiveness of the protocol criteria. There are surely clients and
applicants who would find it a serious hardship to make it to the local
office, and yet would not meet the protocol for scheduling an off-site
interview. The most obvious situation where this might occur is in a location
where public transportation is not available. Lack of public transportation,
or an inability to afford the public transportation that is available, are not
among the criteria for scheduling an off-site interview.40 Since the agency
staff conducting the interview are not the ones scheduling it, they cannot
make exceptions to the policy based on either the client's circumstance or
their own.
Another example occurs when a local office is experiencing a period
of particularly high demand. Local offices communicate their availability to
the Isu using a software program. The software lists a series of available
appointment times, and the intake screener may not schedule appointments
outside of those times. Where the wait for an appointment is greater than
five days, according to the protocol the intake screener must schedule the
appointment, and then contact the local office and advise them that
appointments are being booked more than five days in advance.4 1 Whereas
a local office or a caseworker might be able to schedule an after-hours
appointment for a client who is in crisis, or for whom a wait of five or more
days would be inappropriate, the iSu does not have the ability to do this.
Similarly, if a local office had a last minute cancellation, it might be able to
fill that available time with a client who had asked to have an earlier
appointment if possible. An isu would not be able to do this, for two
reasons. First, the isu would likely not even be aware of the last minute
cancellation. Second, Isus are not permitted, as part of the protocol, to

39 Business Transformation Project, Joint Protocol Working Session, "Protocol-Booking of
Home/Off-Site Visits by the isu," (Revised 22 February 2001), package 2 at 14 [on file with author].
40

Ibid. at 14.

41 Ibid. at 17.
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schedule appointments less than 48 hours in advance.4 2
Centralization limits the ability of the regions to design service
delivery appropriately for its specific circumstances and demographics. A
clear example of the limitations posed by centralization was identified by a
social service delivery taskforce, in its report to Windsor's City Council.
According to a South West Region iSu service delivery protocol, intake
screeners have the discretion to refer an applicant directly to the local
office, bypassing the telephone screening process, in a discrete set of
circumstances where a telephone application would be inappropriate. The
criteria for a bypass of the telephone application seem inclusive enough,
and include literacy, language, and disability barriers.43 However, the
central goal is to conduct 90 per cent of intake interviews using the
telephone screening process. In Windsor, 10 per cent of the population at
large is disabled, 21 per cent are seniors, and there are a large number of
refugees and immigrants who may not speak English. All of these represent
categories of residents who would be at risk of poverty, and also represent
categories of persons for whom the telephone screening process might be
inappropriate according to the joint protocol's own criteria; it is likely that
much more than 10 per cent of applicants from the Windsor area should be
diverted to the in-person interview. Yet the centralized targets restrict the
intake screener from exercising this discretion in as many cases as would
likely be appropriate for the Windsor region.'
This example demonstrates that modeling service delivery on a large
scale limits the agency's ability to exercise discretion, by setting goals that
may not be appropriate for all regions. As Herd and Mitchell conclude, "it
is hard to explain the new application procedure as anything other than a
structured attempt to 45
reduce the number who can successfully negotiate the
application process.
B.

In-Person Interview and the Determinationof Eligibility

For those who pass through the intake telephone screening, the
second stage of the application process, as indicated above, is an in-depth,
person-to-person interview. The interview may also be the first stage where
intake screening by telephone is deemed inappropriate. Just as the
geographic remoteness of the intake screening call centres may have an
42 Ibid. at 13.
43

bid. at 9.

44"Taskforce Report to City Council," unnamed, undated, at 1, 4 [on file with author].
45 Supra note 14 at
25.
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alienating and disentitling effect on applicants, so may the physical design
of interview centres. As Austin Sarat observes, for welfare applicants
waiting represents "the physical embodiment of their own weakness" and46
the experience "of having someone else's place triumph over their time.
The disempowering implications for welfare applicants are exacerbated by
the physical space in which waiting often occurs. One law student described
the ODSP application centre in downtown Toronto in the following terms:
On the second floor, and accessible by an elevator, the waiting area consists of one room,
approximately twenty feet by twenty-five feet. There are two rows of thick plastic chairs, with
the rows facing each other, and approximately six feet between the rows. The chairs are
bolted to the floor. There are approximately 16 chairs in total, although some have signs
taped to them indicating that that chair is broken, and should not be used.
At the far end of the room the reception counter consists of a work area protected entirely
by thick plexi-glass. Clients may pass documents through a small hole in the lower part of the
shield. There is no speaking hole in the plexi-glass.
Numbered "meeting rooms", approximately 12 of them, line two other walls of the room.
These rooms contain nothing more than a desk and one or two green plastic lawn chairs.
Each room is accessible from the waiting room, and also has a "back door" to the secure staff
area. Many of the rooms have a plexi-glass window separating the client and the caseworker,
such as one might see in a high security prison visiting area. Again, there are no holes in the
plexi-glass to facilitate communication, although there is a small hole through which
documents may be passed. Each of the meeting rooms has a window on the door leading to
the waiting room.
Aside from the chairs, and one Government of Canada Job Bank Machine, the waiting room
is completely bare. There are no posters, no information pamphlets, no radio, no magazines
to read while waiting for a worker, nothing. There is no carpeting, no windows to the outside,
There is a shelving unit, which appears to have been used at one time for pamphlets, but it
is completely empty. The walls and floor are painted "institution" pink and green. The
47
atmosphere is cold, untrusting, and uninviting, and needs to be seen to be appreciated.

46 Austin Sarat, "'... The Law is All Over': Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the
Welfare Poor" (1990) 2 Yale J. L. & Human. 343 at 343.
Laura Pottie, "Memorandum on ODSP Centre at 385 Yonge St." (20 February
2003)
[unpublished, on file with author]. This echoes the stark ethos of despair which characterizes many
welfare offices in the United States. One such office was described in the following terms: "The waiting
area is a stark, oppressively stuffy room with dim lights and pale walls. A yellowed map of the United
States hangs conspicuously in one corner, while the remaining walls are bare, except for the black and
white flyers dotting them, commanding "NO EATING IN THIS WAITING AREA." The gray floor
is strewn with broken crayons, pencils, and scraps of papers filled with children's scrawl, perhaps
representative of their own innocent frustration in the waiting. There is no clock on the wall - a fitting
omission in a room where time stands still. ... By 2:00pm children who have been at OESS since 8:00am
are either crying from hunger or falling asleep. Women cannot feed their children in the building, nor
can they leave to get food for fear they will be called for their intake interview and miss it. One woman
fed her children sandwiches in the bathroom so they would not starve while waiting to be called." This
description is quoted in Bennet, supra note 19 at 2157-58.
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The interview itself presents different hazards. This stage includes
an "employment information session," the completion of a "participation
agreement," the completion of an application form, verification of the
information received and requests for additional information if any is
missing or cannot be verified. For those claiming ODSP benefits, the intake
interview is accompanied by the requirement that a "Disability
Determination Package" (DDP) must be completed, which requires
assistance from medical professionals (many of whom charge a user fee for
these services). 48 Applicants receive no support in completing this
paperwork. As the Denial by Design report observes, "Ironically, the
complexity of the package, the lack of any resources to provide support to
applicants or even to reasonably accommodate the very disabilities that
underlies the program, make the program the least accessible to those who
are most vulnerable., 49 Additionally, the Disability Adjudication Unit
(DAU) decision-making process relies almost exclusively on the paper
record in the DDP. Feedback on missing or inadequate documentation is
often not forthcoming, and supplemental reports from specialists are often
required even where primary care physician reports are available. The
result is more cost, complexity and delay. The time lag between an
application and receipt of benefits can be as long as nine months.50
While the absence of support from welfare officials can be a matter
of personal inclination, it is also a matter of the structures and controls
which limit and direct the officials' discretion in their relationship with
recipients. As researchers in the United Kingdom found when interviewing
applicants for public housing assistance, there is a widespread perception
that officials are "dead insensitive," that "there's no understanding of the
people that they're dealing with, they just understand statistics of law,
things like that," and that "you're just a statistic, you're not a human
being. '1
The relationship between officials and applicants is particularly
important at the interview stage of the application process. The DAU, for
48 Fraser, Wiley & Frencshkowski, supra note 14 at 11. The DDP consists of a Health Status
Report, the Activities of Daily Living form, the Self Report, and the Consent to Release of Medical
Information (ibid.).
49

Ibid.

50 Ibid. at 22.
51 David Cowan & Simon Halliday, The Appeal ofInternal Review (London:
Hart, 2003) at 125.
The interviewers concluded that applicants approached decision-makers from a position of relative
powerlessness, and that applicants place their trust in the humanity of officials, the ability of officials
to see and respond to their need. They add that "[tihe importance of being treated with respect and
dignity was a theme which emerged clearly from our data."
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example, has the authority and mandate to interpret the definition of

disability (that is, whether the applicant is "substantially impaired") and to
evaluate the evidence submitted in support of an applicant's file. The DAU
has been criticized 2 for requiring additional evidence of applicants that
proved unnecessary,5 3 for failing to request medical information when

clearly required,54 for failing or refusing to review new evidence,55 for
refusing to consider medical conditions not referred to in DDP forms,56
discounting undiagnosed or unexplained conditions,57 ignoring or unduly

relying on its own policy manual,5 8 and finally, mis-characterizing or
"cherry-picking"

medical evidence to support a conclusion. 9
Notwithstanding the criticisms leveled against the DAU, it is important to
stress that discretion may just as easily be deployed in an applicant's favour.
One former welfare official with whom I spoke indicated that in a
downtown Toronto welfare office, younger officials tended to be more
sympathetic than older ones, and gave applicants "the benefit of the doubt."
My concern is not simply that the form of administration used in welfare
settings allows for bureaucratic disentitlement of applicants, but rather that
administrative design is integral to the exercise of discretion and therefore
52

These criticisms have been gleaned from a review of Social Benefit Tribunal decision dealing

with DAU decisions. I should add that these SBT decisions are not easily obtainable by the public. There
is a fee to have a decision made available and they are not catalogued according to subject matter or
issues raised in the case. I am grateful to the Clinic Resources Office of Legal Aid Ontario for making
available copies of some of the decisions they had collected.
53 See e.g. SBT 0101-00168 (24 August 2001) (DAU asked for all clinical notes and consultation
reports from family doctor even though initial report was detailed and specific) [on file with author].
54 See e.g. SBT 9911-07810 (13 April 2000) (applicant reported seeing the same psychiatrist
for
17 years in her Self Report form but DAU had not approached him for information) [on file with
author].
55 See e.g. SBT 0001-00570 (9 August 2000) (DAU requested additional information
but refused
to review it when it was submitted as it came in 19 days prior to the hearing rather than the 20 days set
out in the rules [on file with author].
56 See e.g. SBT 0004-03736 (24 January 2001) (DAU refused to consider applicant's mental illness
because it had not been listed on original application documents) [on file with author].
57
See e.g. SBT 9906-03972 (19 November 1999), (DAU characterized applicant's impairments

as
mild because investigations had revealed "no explanation" for applicant's conditions) [on file with
author].
58 See e.g. SBT 9903-01606 (August 13, 1999) (DAu relied too heavily on
its manual in assessing
evidence of asthma) and SBT 0010-09741 (5 July 2001) (DAU not adhering to its own manual in its
assessment of applicant's fibromyalgia) [on file with author].
59 See e.g. SBT 9911-08606 (5 July 2000) (Applicant's doctor indicated "I do not have any other
therapies to offer him but hopefully in the next year or so, there will be alternative treatments
available"; DAu quoted only "in the next year or so there will be alternative treatments available") [on
file with author].
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forms of legal accountability should extend to it.
C.

ConsolidatedVerification Process

One familiar type of bureaucratic disentitlement is associated with
"verification extremism. ' ° One of the centerpieces of the new SDM is the
Consolidated Verification Process (cvP) which occurs after a person begins
receiving social assistance benefits. The Province reported that of the first
283,000 cases that were reviewed, 9 per cent had their benefits cut and 16
per cent of cases either withdrew or had their benefits terminated.
According to Herd and Mitchell, there is also considerable evidence that
"the application of CvP 61has resulted in numerous cases being closed
improperly and unfairly."
Individuals in complex or challenging circumstances may be unable
to meet the onerous requirements of continuously proving their eligibility,
which include providing an astounding amount of financial and nonfinancial information and documentation at the risk of benefits being
terminated. As Ian Morrison has observed, "[u]nder the [OWA] ...
administrators no longer have any statutory discretion to waive or modify
requirements.... [T]here are no reasons to suppose that these powers
will
62
not be used to further exclude and deter people in genuine need.,
The inflexibility of the system does not allow the individual
situations of claimants to be taken into account. Practical considerations
including the time and cost involved in obtaining some of the required
documents are often overlooked, exacerbating the worry of recipients that
they would be cut off until the information was provided. In one case, "...
a client was ordered to attend a cvP interview that took place in another
community. She had no care, there was no bus service and a taxi would cost
$60. She was told she would be cut off if she did not attend." 63
In 2001-02, the cvP reviewed approximately 5 per cent of all ow
cases and 0.6 per cent of ODSP cases, closing 22.5 per cent of ow cases and
4 per cent of ODSP cases reviewed. In the future, cvP is expected to result
in the termination of 17 per cent of Ow cases and 3 per cent of ODSP cases

See Bennet, supra note 19 at 2164. Bennet observes, "[f]ixations on the form
of proof of
eligibility--on a particular type of document, or on a particular form of certification of a document-can
be impassable logistical obstacles that bear little relationship to ensuring the integrity of the program"
(ibid.).
61 Herd & Mitchell, supra note 14 at 35.
62 Supra note 7 at 30.
63 Herd & Mitchell, supra note 14 at 42-43.
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While the CvP system appears to have had a profound effect on
some welfare recipients, the degree to which it can be hailed a success has
been the subject of heated controversy. In his 2000 Report, the Provincial
Auditor challenged the Ministry's figures on the benefits of the CvP system:
Case terminations occur for various reasons, including changes in economic conditions,

changes in policies, as well as changes in administrative procedures. As a result of these
multiple effects, the number of cases terminated as a result of changes in administrative
practices, such as the Consolidated Verification Process (cv), cannot be determined with
absolute certainty. Instead, the incremental effect of the CV initiative, for example, was
estimated and included in the benefit pool based on a statistical model designed to obtain a
99% confidence level that benefits were not overstated.
Our concern remains that much of the benefits so determined could and should have been
achieved had ministry staff adhered to the existing policies and procedures for determining
recipient eligibility and implemented recommendations made in previous Provincial Auditor
reports on the social assistance systems. As such it remains our view that these benefits are
not clearly attributable to the changes inherent in the cvp initiative.65

While the verdict may be out on whether cvP has paid for itself, it
seems evident that it has resulted in further instances of what I have
characterized as bureaucratic disentitlement. Here again, the modalities of

the cvP-whether recipients receive assistance in responding to ministry
requests for information, whether interviews are conducted, and if so, in
what setting, how stringent to conduct the verification review, et cetera-all
represent policy decisions which are inextricably linked to the exercise of

discretion over eligibility for benefits.
D.

InternalReconsiderationsandAppeals to the Social Benefits Tribunal

There is a small but growing literature on the non-emergence of
disputes in social assistance decision making.66 Lack of awareness of rights
or procedures, cost, complexity of the appeals process, absence of assistance

or advocacy, and barriers of a physical or other nature are all cited as
reasons why welfare decision making is rarely subject to internal
reconsideration and even more rarely still subject to appeal to a governing
tribunal.
64 Ibid. at 53.

65 Ontario, Provincial Auditor, Special Report on Accountability and Value for Money (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 2000) at 265, online: <http://www.auditor.on.ca/english/reports/en00/4eng00.pdf>
[SpecialReport].

This literature is discussed in Cowan & Halliday, supra note 51 at 3.
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To the extent that there is any accountability for the administrative
process that welfare applicants and recipients must navigate in Ontario, it
should come, presumably, in the form of internal reconsiderations and
appeal to the Social Benefits Tribunal (SBT). At the telephone intake
screening stage, a conclusion of ineligibility is followed by written notice,
and applicants have 10 days from the receipt of such notice to object before
the finding becomes a final decision with no right of appeal. If the objection
is made in time, the applicant is entitled to an interview with a case
manager, which will result either in a reversal of the intake screening
finding or in that finding being upheld. Internal reviews following an inperson interview (usually the second stage of the process in ow
applications; and usually the first stage in the ODSP application process), an
internal review is also available-the reconsideration is conducted based on
the paper record alone and decisions are rarely overturned." The most
significant aspect of the internal reconsideration is that it may give rise to
additional delay and anxiety, and in some cases to the mistaken impression
that an unsuccessful result exhausts the appeal recourse to applicants.
Applicants whose initial negative determination has been upheld after the
internal review, are entitled to apply in writing within thirty days to have the
SBT consider an appeal. There is no mechanism, however, for ensuring that
communicating this right occurs in a timely or complete fashion.
The SBT has jurisdiction over both ow and ODSP decision-making.
In 2000-01, the SBT received upwards of 12,000 appeals, with about twothirds coming from the DAU decisions. SBT appeals are time-consuming. It
is not uncommon for a year to elapse between the filing of an appeal and
the issuing of a decision. The SBT appeal typically requires additional
paperwork, and has its own complex rules and processes; those appealing
tend to have far more successful outcomes when represented than when
unrepresented. 68 While judicial review of decisions made by the SBT is
available (though only for errors of law), such challenges, given the time
and resources involved, are exceedingly rare.69 It is also worth noting that
67 See Fraser, Wiley & Frencshkowski, supra note 14 at 23. The authors compiled ODSP Branch
statistics for 2002 and found that initial negative determinations were changed 11 per cent of the time.
In an interview with a former welfare official, he indicated that it was not uncommon for the internal
review to be conducted, de facto, by the same official who handled the initial application. Even where
the internal review is conducted by a supervisor, it will most often be the decision maker who is able to
communicate his or her perspective in person while the affected party is limited to written
submissions-a further barrier, of course, for those applicants who lack adequate literacy skills.
Those with representation were successful 60 per cent of the time, while those
who were
unrepresented were successful 30 per cent of the time (ibid.at 25).
69 See e.g. Gallierv. Ontario, [2000] O.J. No. 4541 (Div. Ct.). See also Gray v. Ontario (Disability
Support Program,Director)(2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 364 (C.A.) [Gray] (discussed below).
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decisions are not binding precedents, either on courts or even on the
itself. Each decision is limited to its particular circumstances. Even
where SBT appeals may rectify individual injustices,7 ° they lack the scope or
reach to affect issues of administrative design, or to remedy the
bureaucratic disentitlement in the many cases which never reach the appeal
stage.
SBT
SBT

E.

Conclusion

The detailed overview of the application determination process is
intended to convey a sense of both the daunting challenges that face
applicants in the new SDM in Ontario, and of the link between the
administrative features of a decision-making process and the substantive
outcomes of that process. While advocacy reports such as "Discouraged,
Diverted and Disentitled" and "Denial by Design" raise public awareness
about the social assistance system and its human consequences, neither
addresses the question: what has law got to do with it? Or, more to the
point, is law part of the problem or part of the solution in relation to
bureaucratic disentitlement?
III.

LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY
ADMINISTRATION

AND

WELFARE

Public law (in which I include administrative and constitutional
principles and doctrines) typically emphasizes two aspects of
accountability-procedural and substantive. 71 These might apply to the
system of welfare administration in a number of ways. Procedurally, one
might argue that the bureaucratic system through which one is compelled
to navigate negates the chance to participate meaningfully in the decisionmaking process. Substantively, one might argue that the decisions of
ineligibility are reached on the basis of arbitrary or irrelevant factors related
to the administrative process. Below, I canvass the doctrinal hurdles such
claims would likely face and the method by which I believe these hurdles
may be overcome.
The purpose of this doctrinal analysis is twofold. First, I wish to
70

All of the cases referred to in footnotes 52-59 are representative of such cases.

71 For an overview of each type of accountability, see Michael J. Bryant & Lorne Sossin, Public
Law (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at 66-73, c. 4. The distinction between substance and procedure in
administrative law is particularly porous and the value of this doctrinal distinction is open to debate. See
David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, "Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v.
Canada" (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 193.
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point out how existing administrative and constitutional law constraints may
provide a means to redress incidence of bureaucratic disentitlement in
welfare eligibility decision making; and second, I wish to point out the
inadequacy of those constraints as presently conceived. Adapting Mashaw's
link between due process and dignitary values, I wish to suggest that
administrative law doctrines cannot and should not be divorced from the
process values that they reflect and reproduce. Process values such as
equality of treatment, predictability, transparency, rationality, participation,
and fairness are the cornerstones of our system of administrative law and
fundamental to the dignity of those whose life opportunities are affected by
administrative decision making. Bureaucratic disentitlement is a concern
for administrative and constitutional law not merely because it introduces
arbitrariness, discrimination, and subterfuge into the administrative
process, but because it denies core aspects of human dignity to those
adversely affected.
A.

In Search of Fairness:Disentitlement by Process

Traditionally, advocating for welfare rights meant arguing for more
process. In Goldberg v. Kelly,72 the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that
welfare benefits were statutory "entitlements" which could not be
terminated without "due process."73 In Goldberg, as well as in the
subsequent case Mathews v. Eldridge,74 the Court balanced the "individual's
right to procedural protections ...
against the governmental interest in
75
keeping costs down." However, for the U.S. Court, this balancing takes
place in the individual, adjudicative context. In other words, the issue in
Goldberg and its progeny was when hearings were necessary, not whether
the administration of welfare itself was fair or reasonable.76
72 397 U.S. 254 (1970) [Goldberg].
Goldberg confirmed that a public assistance payment could not be terminated to
a particular
recipient without affording him the opportunity for an "evidentiary hearing" because such benefits were
a matter of statutory entitlement for those eligible to receive them. Therefore, terminating these
benefits triggered the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Ibid.
at 255, Brennan J.
74424 U.S. 319 (1976).
75 David J. Kennedy, "Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System" (1998) 64 Brook, L. Rev. 231
at 283.
76 A similar point is made by William Simon in his appraisal of Goldberg on its 20th anniversary.
Simon contends that Goldberg imported a private law notion of fairness into the social benefits arena,
focused on the individual seeking relief, rather than structural relief. He notes, "Goldberg did not
challenge basic assumptions about the nature of procedural fairness that the legal culture had developed
principally in connection with private law claims. Its conception of fairness focused on claims initiated
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In Re Webb and OntarioHousing Corporation, the Ontario Court
of Appeal recognized an analogous principle of administrative law in
Canada.7' It is perhaps of more than historical interest to note, however,
that the Ontario Court of Appeal, in recognizing that social benefit
recipients (and, by extension, social benefit applicants) are owed a degree
of fairness, distanced this protection from the rationale applied in Goldberg.
Associate Chief Justice Mackinnon noted, "there is no statutory entitlement
in the appellant to either secure or remain in subsidized housing and I do
not find the reasoning in Goldberg
of assistance in resolving the problem
' 79
which confronts this Court.
Procedural fairness rights in social assistance settings are now well
developed. Fairness rights are said to be "eminently variable," and shift
according to statutory and factual context. The case most responsible for
extending the duty of fairness throughout the realm of administrative

decision making, and particularly into the area of discretionary decision
making, is Bakerv. Canada(Ministerof Citizenshipand Immigration).8 0 This

case involved a ministerial decision to deport a woman with Canadian-born
children on the basis of seemingly biased notes taken by an immigration
officer. Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 found for the majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada that the circumstances of Ms. Baker's case required "full
by individuals for relief for themselves, and on an adjudicative process independent of and
differentiated from the process of general or line administration. The Court had no occasion in Goldberg
to adopt the perspective of'public law litigation' or 'structural' relief that on occasion has led the federal
courts to assess and remake the administrative processes of schools, prisons and mental health facilities,
and it has not applied this perspective to the welfare system since then." See "The Rule of Law and the
Two Realms of Welfare Administration" (1990) 56 Brooklyn L. Rev. 777 at 777.
77 (1978),22 O.R. (2d) 257 (C.A.) [Webb].
78

Prior to Webb, decisions regarding social benefits were considered "administrative" rather than

"judicial" or "quasi-judicial" and therefore not subject to procedural fairness obligations. In Nicholson
v. Haldimond-Norfolk (RegionalMunicipality)CommissionersofPolice, [ 1979] 1 S.C.R. 311, the Supreme
Court of Canada had held that this distinction no longer had relevance for the reach of procedural
obligations, thus opening the door for procedural rights in social welfare settings. In Webb, the issue was
whether a tenant of a public housing corporation was entitled to notice and a right to be heard prior to
receiving an eviction notice. The Court held that she was entitled to these fairness rights but that the
housing corporation had satisfied them by providing her written notice of their intention and the basis
for their action (the fact that the tenant was illiterate did not move the Court as there was evidence her
children could have read her the letter in question). This is certainly an inauspicious case on which to
found a welfare rights movement.
79 Webb, supra note 77 at 263
80 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 [Baker]. Ms. Baker applied for an exemption under the Immigration Act
from the requirement that her application for permanent residence be made outside of Canada for
humanitarian and compassionate reasons (primarily, the effect of her departure on her Canadian-born
children), but her application was rejected by the Minister on the basis of the notes made by the
immigration officer reviewing her case. The letter informing her of that fact contained no reasons.
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and fair consideration of the issues," and that the "claimant and others
whose important interests are affected by the decision in a fundamental way
must have a meaningful opportunity to present the various types of
evidence relevant to their case and have it fully and fairly considered.",8' It
also found that the Minister was under some obligation to give reasons
(which was satisfied by the provision of the immigration officer's notes to
the appellant's counsel) and that the immigration officer's reasons reflected
bias.
In coming to this conclusion, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 found that
the purpose of the participatory rights contained within the duty of
procedural fairness was to ensure that "administrative decisions are made
using a fair and open procedure, appropriate to the decision being made
and its statutory, institutional and social context, with an opportunity for
those affected to put forward their views and evidence fully and have them
considered by the decision-maker." She also identified the following factors
as relevant in determining the content of the duty of fairness:
the nature of the decision being made and process followed in making it (i.e. the closeness
of the administrative process to judicial process);
the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the body
operates (i.e. whether or not there is a statutory right of appeal, whether the decision is final;
the importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected;
the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; and
the choices of procedures made by the agency itself. 82

The first and last of these criteria are of the most interest for an
analysis of what might be characterized as "systemic fairness." These
criteria suggest that where a decision-making process appears more
"administrative" than "judicial" -that is, where it is either more routinized,
discretionary or benefit-conferring rather than rights-balancing-less
fairness will be owed. There is little room in this analysis to probe behind
the choice of procedures made by the agency to determine if those
procedures themselves are "fair." Rather, the fact that an administrative
body saw fit to choose them will itself justify a measure of deference. Baker
itself exemplifies this distinction. While the Court was highly critical of the
immigration officer's rationale for denying the discretionary exemption to
81 Ibid. at 843.
82 Ibid. at 838-40.
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Ms. Baker on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, there was no
inquiry into the system itself. In other words, the Court did not inquire into
what kind of training, administrative culture, or discretionary criteria
produce the kind of bias typified by the decision in Ms. Baker's case. 3
In the context of social assistance, the Ontario Court of Appeal
discussed the post-Baker procedural obligations owed by decision makers
in Gray.'4 Gray is the first challenge to a determination under the
restructured welfare system in Ontario to reach the Court of Appeal. It
involved an appeal from a decision of the SBT upholding the finding of the
Disability Adjudication Unit (DAU) that an ODSP applicant was not a person
with a disability within the meaning of the Act.85 The DAU had accepted the
evidence of the medical specialists which indicated that the applicant had
a condition that resulted in some impairment but not of sufficient intensity
or duration to meet the statutory condition (that is, that it precluded her
from functioning in the workplace or that it placed substantial restrictions
on her daily activities). This was enough to persuade the SBT to dismiss her
appeal, and for the majority of the Divisional Court to conclude that the
SBT had not erred in law. For the Court of Appeal, however, it was
significant that the SBT had also found the applicant, whose submission was
that her condition did result in substantial restrictions to her daily life, to
be a credible witness. The Court of Appeal found it puzzling that the SBT
both found the applicant to be credible but discounted the content of her
submission.
The Court of Appeal observed that the ODSPA, as remedial
legislation, should be interpreted "broadly and liberally" and in accordance
with its purpose of "providing support to persons with disabilities." 6
Therefore, Chief Justice McMurtry concluded that any ambiguity should be
resolved in favour of the applicant. In light of this standard, the failure of
the SBT to account for why it appeared to ignore the applicant's description
of her condition became a crucial omission. The ODSPA requires that the
SBT include in its reasons its findings of fact and its conclusions based on
those findings.87 According to Chief Justice McMurtry, the SBT failed to
83

While administrative law recognizes "institutional bias" as well as "individual bias," this category

typically refers to concerns over multiple functions of administrative personnel (for example, where one
official takes part in the investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative phases of an administrative
proceeding). It does not relate to the discriminatory or arbitrary effects of an administrative system.
84 Gray, supra note 69. See also the discussion of analogous obligations in Ginter v. Manitoba
(Director,Employment and Income Assistance), 2004 M.B.C.A. 36.
85 ODSPA,
supra note 6, s.4(1).
86 Gray,supra note 69 at 370.
87Ibid. at 371.
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discharge its statutory, procedural obligation to the applicant. He cited with
approval a Federal Court of Appeal decision, Via Rail Canadav. Canada
(NationalTransportationAgency),8 which included the following passage on
the content of reasons:
The duty to give reasons is only fulfilled if the reasons provided are adequate .... The
obligation to provide adequate reasons is not satisfied by merely reciting the submissions and
evidence of the parties and stating a conclusion. Rather the decision-maker must set out its
findings of fact and the principal evidence upon which those findings were based. The
reasons must address the major points in issue. The reasoning process followed by the
89
decision maker must be set out and must reflect consideration of the main relevant factors.

Thus, for the Ontario Court of Appeal, accounting for the
''reasoning process" represented a core component of the procedural
requirement to provide "reasons" (which Baker had left ambiguous). In my
view, this is significant. If the "reasoning process" is affected by the
administrative process within which the reasoning takes place (the
importance of policy manuals, guidelines, and directives would be the
easiest example, but by extension this could include restrictions imposed by
intake scripts, database fields, or documentary requirements) then arguably
such impacts should be considered in the duty to provide reasons as well.
While the present doctrines of procedural fairness have some

salutary implications for the welfare system and may result in discretionary
justice in individual cases, there is little in the development of
administrative law to suggest courts will be willing to subject a service

delivery model to a fairness analysis. This is so for reasons of principle and
reasons of practicality. The principled reason is that procedural fairness as

a common law norm is seen in primarily adjudicative terms-that is, was the
affected individual given a "fair" hearing as intended by the governing
legislation? This individual, adjudicative focus, together with the subsuming

of fairness within legislative intent, results in systemic issues (and remedies)

falling outside the purview of the court. 9° The practical reason is that

systemic issues will almost never reach a court given the dense process for
internal reconsideration and appeals. Because, as a general rule, all of
88 [2001] 2 F.C. 25 at 35-36.
89 Cited in Gray, supra note 69 at 374.
901 should add that some procedural fairness obligations are themselves statutory-these may be
included within a statute, as are the appeal rights contained within the Ontario Works and Ontario
Disability Support Plan legislation, or they may be contained in general procedural statutes, such as the
Ontario Statutory Powers Procedure Act (R.S.O. 1990, c. S-22). They may also flow from quasiconstitutional statutes such as the CanadianBill ofRights (S.C. 1960 c. 44, s. 2(e)) or the Quebec Charter
of Human Rights andFreedoms (R.S.Q. c. C-12, s. 23). None of these instruments, however, speaks to
constraints on government in the design of service delivery models.
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these internal appeals must be exhausted prior to the availability of judicial
review,9 the issue before the Court, as in Gray, will be the legal correctness
of the SBT decision, not underlying flaws in the administrative system. In
short, the fairness of the administrative system effectively lies outside the
scope of administrative law as it is presently applied.
B.

Fairness,Procedureand ConstitutionalNorms

In addition to the administrative law doctrine of procedural
fairness, section 7 of the Charter,which provides that "everyone has a right
to life, liberty and security of the person and a right not to be deprived
' 92
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice,,
also provides procedural protections. For the most part, this section has
been applied to the criminal justice context. 93 An important strand of
constitutional jurisprudence, however, has focused on the procedural norms
constitutionally required of the administrative process. These procedural
rights are not absolute but rather vary according to the circumstances. 94
In Singh v. Canada,95 the first case to explore the procedural fairness
component of section 7, three justices of a six-justice majority found that
the statutory denial of an oral hearing for refugee claimants violated section
7. Importantly, although this case was decided before the development of
the proportionality Oakes standard for justifying Charter infringements
under section 1, Justice Wilson asserted that "administrative convenience"
was not an acceptable justification for denying a person fairness to which
they were constitutionally entitled. The Supreme Court returned to the
procedural dimension of Charter rights in Morgentaler v. The Queen,96 in
which the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
procedure required for women to obtain an abortion, because of its delay,
complexity, and uncertainty, violated the psychological dimension of the
91 For a discussion and application of this principle, see Falkinerv.Ontario(Ministerof
Community
and Social Services) (1996), 140 D.L.R. (4th) 115 (Div. Ct.).
92 Supra note 12.
93

Gosselin v. Quebec (AttorneyGeneral), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 at 489, per McLachlin C.J.
[Gosselin].
Indeed, in Suresh v. Canada (Ministerof Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R.
3 at 61,

the Court indicated that while the procedural rights provided by the Charterunder s.7 are not identical
to those rights provided at common law, the degree of fairness appropriate to particular circumstances
should be assessed according to the same framework as the Court has developed for common law
procedural protections, and in particular according to the same criteria set out in Bakerfor determining
the appropriate degree of fairness owed in a particular administrative context.
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
96 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [Morgentaler].
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security of the person protection under section 7.97 Again, the Court held
that this procedural violation could not be justified under section 1.
In New Brunswick (Ministerof Health and Community Services) v.
G. (j.), 98 the Supreme Court linked the threshold of section 7, and therefore

access to its procedural protections, with the notion of stigma and the
protection of human dignity. Section 7 is engaged in an administrative
process, in other words, where as a result of state action, a person is subject
to stigma sufficient to interfere with the psychological dimension of the

right to security of the person. Thus, in G. (J.), where a woman faced a
proceeding to extend a wardship application over her children without legal
representation, Chief Justice Lamer, writing for the majority, found that:
When government actions triggers a hearing in which the interests protected by section 7 ...
are engaged, it is under an obligation to do whatever is required to ensure that the hearing
be fair. In some circumstances, depending on the seriousness of the interests at stake, the
complexity of the proceedings, and the capacities of the parent, the government may be
required to provide an indigent parent with state-funded counsel. 9

G. (J.) is a potentially important precedent as it links the complexity
of a process and the capacities of the people affected with the overall
fairness of the decision making. If the Charter requires a state-funded
lawyer in a wardship proceeding, might it call for at least some minimal,
state funded assistance for a vulnerable person attempting to comply with
a detailed request for verification of documents? While this line of Charter
jurisprudence has promise, as I have argued elsewhere,100 the use of a
subjective marker such as stigma in determining when section 7 procedural

protections are triggered is an unfortunate choice for complex
administrative proceedings. What is the stigma attached to being denied
social assistance? Does it vary from person to person or across time and
97

Morgentalerwas a majority decision, but the reasons for the decision were fractured.
Beetz J.
and Estey J. took the narrowest approach, finding that by requiring a woman to get committee approval
for medical treatment that was necessary to protect life and health, the impugned law infringed that
woman's security of the person, and that the arbitrary fashion with which such approval was granted
infringed principles of fundamental justice. Dickson C.J., with Lamer J., found that the delay caused by
the administrative or approval process constituted an infringement of both the physical and the
psychological aspects of the individual's right to security of the person. With respect to the latter, he
accepted expert testimony that: "there is increased psychological stress imposed upon women who are
forced to wait for abortions, and ... this stress is compounded by the uncertainty whether or not a
therapeutic abortion committee will actually grant approval" (ibid. at 60).
981999] 3 S.C.R. 46 [G.(J)].
99

Ibid. at 57-58.

100 Lorne Sossin, "Developments in Administrative Law: The 1999-2000 Term" (2000)
13 S.C.L.R.
(2d) at 54.
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place? Would that stigma change if the reason you are denied social
assistance is your inability to complete required information over the
phone, or your failure to provide required documentation?
The Supreme Court of Canada provides at least a partial answer to
these questions in Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights
Commission).'ot This case involved administrative delay with respect to the
hearing of a human rights complaint against a well-known former cabinet
minister. The majority in Blencoe, in finding that the delay did not violate
either common law or constitutional standards, held that section 7 of the
Charterwas not engaged because the stigma complained of resulted from
the damage to the respondent's reputation through negative media
attention. In other words, it was not state action (that is the delay in the
administrative proceeding) that caused the stigma, but rather the
circumstances of Blencoe's notoriety. The Court went on to stress that
section 7 does not recognize a general right to be free from stigma, nor is
there a general positive right to human dignity under the Charter.In order
for a delay to breach section 7, Justice Bastarache concluded, it would have
to be caused by the state and interfere with "profoundly intimate and
personal," "essential" life choices. 1°2
The logic of Blencoe, and its close association of stigma, human
dignity and professional reputation, all suggest that Charter procedural
rights, while in some sense well-tailored to the complexity versus capacity
issues raised by the welfare system, will not often be engaged in that setting.
It is difficult to argue that a welfare applicant or recipient's "professional
reputation" will be besmirched by the denial of benefits by the state.
However, perhaps a more expansive understanding of human dignity as a
constitutional norm would encompass the dehumanizing and alienating
features of the administrative process accompanying the welfare system
described above.
C.

In Search of Reasonableness:Disentitlementand the Merits

As indicated above, discretionary decision making, such as
determinations of how welfare eligibility is to be assessed, gives rise not
only to procedural obligations but also to substantive obligations. °3
101 [2000]
2 S.C.R. 307 [Blencoe].

102 Ibid. at 311.
103 The primary source of such obligations will be the empowering statute. In the social welfare
sphere, however, such substantive constraints are diminishing. For example, the previous federalprovincial agreement for the funding of social assistance programs, called the Canada Assistance Plan,
constrained the provinces from compelling recipients to work as a condition of receiving benefits, among
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Highlighted in the oft-cited reasons of Justice Rand in Roncarelli v.
Duplessis,'04it is a principle of Canadian administrative and constitutional
law that no grant of discretion is "untrammeled" and that "there
is always
05
a perspective within which a statute is intended to operate.'
Where an exercise of discretion is found to be arbitrary or
undertaken for improper purposes or ulterior motives or in bad faith, then
the decision maker, in effect, is held to have exceeded his or her statutory
authority. Subsequently added to the list of grounds justifying judicial
intervention was where a discretionary decision maker considered irrelevant
factors or failed to consider relevant factors.0 6 The proper purposes of a
statutory discretion and the distinction between relevant and irrelevant
factors flow from an analysis of legislative intent.
Section 1 of the Ontario Works Act sets out that the purpose of the
Act is to establish a program that: (a) recognizes individual responsibility
and promotes self reliance through employment; (b) provides temporary
financial assistance to those most in need while they satisfy obligations to
become and stay employed; (c) effectively serves people needing assistance;

other requirements. When that shared cost program was replaced by the block grant Canada Health
and Social Transfer, the national standards constraining provincial welfare programs were eliminated
(with the exception of the requirement that no residency test be imposed on welfare recipients). For a
discussion of the legality of the elimination of national standards, see Lorne Sossin, "Salvaging the
Welfare State? The Prospects for Judicial Review of the Canada Health & Social Transfer" (1998) 21
Dal. L.J. 141.
104 [1959] S.C.R. 121.
105 Ibid. at 140. In Baker,supra 79 note at 853-54, L'Heureux-Dub6 J.summarized the approach
of Canadian administrative law to the substantive review of discretion in the following terms:
Administrative law has traditionally approached the review of decisions classified as
discretionary separately from those seen as involving the interpretation of rules of law. The
rule has been that decisions classified as discretionary may only be reviewed on limited
grounds such as the bad faith of decision-makers, the exercise of discretion for an improper
purpose, and the use ofirrelevant considerations.... A general doctrine of 'unreasonableness'
has also sometimes been applied to discretionary decisions.... In my opinion, these doctrines
incorporate two central ideas-that discretionary decisions, like all other administrative
decisions, must be made within the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute, but
that considerable deference will be given to decision-makers by the courts in reviewing the
exercise of that discretion and determining the scope of the decision-maker's jurisdiction ...
However, discretion must still be exercised in a manner that is within a reasonable
interpretation of the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the legislature, in accordance
with the principles of the rule of law (Roncarelliv. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121), in line with
general principles of administrative law governing the exercise of discretion, and consistent
with the CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms (Slaight Communications v. Davidson,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038).
106 See Sheehan v. Ontario (CriminalInjuries Compensation Board) (1974), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 728
(Ont. C.A.); and Maple Lodge FarmsLtd. v. Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2.
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and (d) is accountable to the taxpayers of Ontario.l0 7 The third of these four
principles would seem the most relevant to the SDM. If the Ministry
announced an explicit policy of bureaucratic disentitlement, presumably it
could be said to be at odds with the purpose of "effectively" serving people
needing assistance. Of course, this is not the Ministry's policy. In fact,
Directive 2.0, "Principles for Delivery," sets forth five core principles said
to animate the delivery of welfare services in Ontario, and states that
Ontario Works "respects people's dignity; enhances their self-esteem;
fosters independence, self-reliance
and community contribution and
08
promotes employment.'
The connection between substantive review for misuse of discretion
and the system of welfare administration relates to these jurisdictional
constraints. Arguably, the administrative barriers created by the new SDM,
whether as a matter of design or execution, come very close to any
definition of "arbitrary." While one may disagree on where this line is, it is
hard to accept that the line does not exist. If a benefit to single mothers, for
example, required that applicants could only meet the eligibility criteria by
showing up at night to a remote office, surely the denial of a benefit to
those unable to find a babysitter or unable to access the office could not be
considered "reasonable"?10 9
Try as it might, the Supreme Court has yet to articulate a tenable
basis on which to distinguish judicial intervention in the decision-making
process from judicial intervention in the decision-making outcome. n As
10 7 Supra note 5,
s. 1.
108 Ontario, Ministry of Community and Social Services (September 2001) at 2, online:
< http://www.cfcs.gov.on.ca/NR/MCFCS/OW/Engish/02_0.pdf>. The principles are mostly inscrutable
but are accompanied by clear mandates. For example, Principle 1 states that "Delivery agents must
focus on supporting participants to participate actively in determining and taking steps that represent
the shortest route to employment for the individual participant and on other measures to support system
integrity" (ibid.). The accompanying notes state that this principle is demonstrated by, among other
things, "the ability to identify and follow up high risk cases to reduce fraud" (ibid.at 3).
109 This scenario is not as far fetched as it might sound. One of the strategies routinely used
in the
southern American states to ensure federal benefits did not reach African American sharecroppers was
to only open the welfare offices during hours in which the harvesting of crops took place. See Michael
R. Sosin, "Legal Rights and Welfare Change, 1960-1980" in Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel Weinberg,
eds., FightingPoverty: What Works at What Doesn't (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986)
at 267.
110 The Court's most recent attempt to do this took place in CanadianUnion
of Public Employees
(CUPE) v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [20031 1 S.C.R. 539. In that case, the Court nullified the
appointment of retired judges to chair arbitration panels in the hospital field because the Minister had
failed to consider certain relevant factors-namely whether the retired judges were mutually acceptable
to the parties. The majority concludes that the decision was both procedurally fair (because the Minister
had never promised that the appointments would be acceptable and therefore the unions had no
legitimate expectation that they would be) and patently unreasonable (because the Minister nonetheless
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Baker illustrates, bias is as much a procedural as a substantive concern, and
the requirement that reasons be given cannot be understood divorced from
the requirement that a decision be reasonable. By the same token, there is
no basis that I can see for subjecting the reasonableness of a discretionary

(that is, not arbitrary) decision to judicial scrutiny but not the
reasonableness of the administrative framework which shapes, and in some
cases determines, those decisions.
1.

Substantive Review and The Charter's Application to Welfare
Administration Revisited

The departure point for any discussion of substantive constraint in
the design of social assistance benefits is that there is no constitutional right
to welfare in Canada. Following a series of lower court decisions on the
question,' the Supreme Court of Canada finally tackled this issue in
Gosselin v. Quebec. 1 2 In that case, a woman had her social assistance
benefits cut after failing to participate in a mandatory job training program
for recipients under the age of 30. With respect to whether this reduction

in benefits constituted a violation of substantive guarantees under section
7, Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the majority, held that it did not
(although she left the door slightly ajar to the possibility that substantive
rights might be recognized in the future):
One day section 7 maybe interpreted to include positive obligations. To evoke Lord Sankey's
celebrated phrase in Edwards v. Attorney-Generalfor Canada, [1930] AC 124, the Canadian
Charter must be viewed as "living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural
limits": see Reference Re ProvincialElectoral Boundaries (Sask), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158, at p.
180,per McLachlin J.It would be a mistake to regard s. 7 as frozen, or its content as having
been exhaustively defined in previous cases. ... I leave open the possibility that a positive
obligation to sustain life, liberty, or security of person may be made out in special
circumstances. However, this is not such a case. The impugned program contained
compensatory "workfare" provisions and the evidence of actual hardship is wanting. The frail

had an obligation to consider the acceptability of the appointees to the unions).
See, for example, Clarkv. PeterboroughUtilitiesCommission (1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 7
(Gen. Div.)
(in which the Court rejected the claim that the requirement of a deposit by the utilities commission had
an adverse impact on the poor and violated s. 7 of the Charter);Conrad v. Halifax (County) (1993), 124
N.S.R. (2d) 251 (S.C.) (holding that economic benefits such as social welfare lay beyond the scope of
s. 7); Bernardv. Dartmouth HousingAuthority (1988), 88 N.S.R. (2d) 190 (rejecting the argument that
the Public Housing authority had violated the appellant's right to security of the person by giving her
notice to vacate); Fernandesv. Manitoba (Directorof Social Services (Winnipeg Central)) (1992), 93
D.L.R. (4th) 402 (Man. C.A.) (in which claimant sought increase in welfare payments to permit him to
receive medical care at home rather than in a hospital. The court dismissed claim holding that the right
to a certain standard of living or way of life could not be protected under s. 7).
112 Supra note 93.
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platform provided by the facts of this case cannot support the weight of a positive state
3
obligation of citizen support."1

This is not to say that the provision of social assistance is not subject
to substantive constraints, typically under the equality freedoms guaranteed

under section

15.114

Bureaucratic disentitlement, however, is not a clear sanction in the

same was as are penalties for not participating in workfare. It is, as
discussed above, a series of structural and situational features of the welfare
eligibility process which together have the effect of discouraging applicants
and demoralizing recipients. Can the Charterhold government accountable

for the substantive design of administrative systems? The most significant
case exploring the application of the Charter where the administrative
system is implicated in a discretionary determination is Little Sisters Book
and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice). 5 The discretionary
authority at issue in this case concerns the power of customs officials to
seize imported goods that meet the obscenity test under s. 163 of the
Criminal Code. Little Sisters is a bookshop in Vancouver specializing in
lesbian-oriented material whose owners claimed that their Charterrights
were violated by the targeting actions of Customs officers in seizing, over
a period of several years, materials that Little Sisters sought to import from
the United States.
Justice Binnie, writing for the majority, characterized the
administration of the Customs Act (which included a technical manual
depicting as obscene representations that the Supreme Court had held not
113 Ibid. at 491-92. In one of the first post-Gosselin challenges to involve a Charterright
to welfare,
a number of advocacy groups in Ontario are challenging the lifetime welfare ban imposed as a penalty
against those found to have engaged in fraud. The Court earlier decided that an injunction against this
practice was not appropriate, but left the merits of the challenge to be decided in a hearing scheduled
for the Fall of 2003. See Broomer v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2002] O.J. No 2196 (Sup. Ct. J.). The
Liberal government, elected in the Fall of 2003, adjourned the litigation and announced it would
eliminate the lifetime ban.
114 Courts traditionally have been unwilling to recognize recipients of social benefits as a discrete
and insular minority for the purposes of s.15 of the Charter(see Martha Jackman, "Poor Rights: Using
the Charter to Support Social Welfare Claims" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 65; and Martha Jackman, "The
Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257). Therefore most
claimants have had to advance other markers as indicia of discrimination (e.g. gender, marital status,
status in public housing, etc). See, for example, Dartmouth/HalifaxCounty Regional HousingAuthority
v. Sparks, (1993), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 224 (N.S.C.A.); and Helena Orton, "Section 15, Benefits Programs
and Other Benefits at Law: The Interpretation of Section 15 of the Charter since Andrews" (1990) 19
Man. L.J. 288. Notably, "social assistance recipient" was recognized by the Ontario Court of Appeal as
an analogous ground in s. 15 of the Charterin Falkinerv. Ontario, (2002) 59 O.R. (3d) 481 [Falkiner].
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted in March 2003.
115 [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 [Little Sisters].
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to be obscene, inadequate training and resources, and a corrosive
administrative culture that placed the least able officials in charge of

obscenity determinations) as oppressive and dismissive of Little Sisters'
freedom of expression. He concluded that the effect of the seizures of
material at issue-whether intended or not-was to isolate and disparage
the appellants on the basis of their sexual orientation. As a result, the Court
granted Little Sisters declaratory remedies vindicating its objections to

particular seizures. The majority declined, however, to strike down the
legislative power to seize obscene material, which Little Sisters had
requested as a remedy. Justice Binnie was also unwilling to subject the
administrative system underlying obscenity determinations to Charter
scrutiny. He concluded:
The trial judge concluded that Customs' failure to make Memorandum D9-1-1 conform to
the Justice Department opinion on the definition of obscenity violated the appellants' Charter
rights. However, I agree with the British Columbia Court of Appeal that the trial judge put
too much weight on the Memorandum, which was nothing more than an internal
administrative aid to Customs inspectors. It was not law. It could never have been relied upon
by Customs in court to defend a challenged prohibition. The failure of Customs to keep the
document updated is deplorable public administration, because use of the defective guide led
to erroneous decisions that imposed an unnecessary administrative burden and cost on
importers and Customs officers alike. Where an importer could not have afforded to carry
the fight to the courts a defective Memorandum D9-1-1 may have directly contributed to a
denial of constitutional rights. It is the statutory decision, however, not the manual, that
constituted the denial. It is simply not feasible for the courts to review for Charter compliance
the vast array of manuals and guides prepared by the public service for the internal guidance
of officials. The courts are concerned with the legality of the decisions, 16not the quality of the
guidebooks, although of course the fate of the two are not unrelated.

I have taken issue elsewhere with Justice Binnie's characterization
of the administrative manual as not "law.,, 117 My interest in this passage
here is Justice Binnie's implication that the Charteris not concerned with
"deplorable public administration." According to the Court, the Charter
may remedy individual discretionary decisions only where they violate
Charter protections, and the legislative provision granting the discretion
only where any exercise of the power would violate the Charter.1 8 Writing
for the minority, Justice lacobucci drew on another line of Chartercase law,
116 Ibid. at 1173.
117 Lorne Sossin, "Discretion Unbound: Reconciling the Charter and Soft Law" (2003) 45
Canadian Public Administration 465 at 481.
118 See Slaight CommunicationsInc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038. For further discussion of
this "two track" approach to discretion, see ibid. and Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, "Racial and Ethnic
Profiling: Statutory Discretion, Constitutional Remedies and Democratic Accountability" (2003) 41
Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 at 3-5.
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notably reflected by Morgentaler," 9 under which a court could strike down
a legislative scheme that did not adequately constrain administrative
discretion or prevent unconstitutional exercises of authority.
Where the problem is not with particular decisions or with general
legislation, however, the abrogation of Charter rights through a
discriminatory or arbitrary eligibility process would appear to lie outside the
reach of the courts. Lower court decisions, by contrast, appear to have
recognized the influence that administrative procedures have over decision
making.
In Glasgow v. Nova Scotia (Ministerof Community Services),1 20 for
example, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court reviewed a Department of
Community Services policy guideline that required income assistance
applicants to sign a consent form authorizing the Department to gather a
wide range of information from third parties in order to assess their
eligibility. The applicant argued that the policy constituted a violation of the
right to privacy as provided by section 7 of the Charter among other
grounds. While Justice Davison did not agree that the policy violated
Charterrights, it was not because
such an administrative rule could not in
2
principle violate the Charter.' 1
There is of course a difference between subjecting a particular
policy to Charter scrutiny and an entire administrative system of service
delivery. Glasgow and Little Sisters hold out some promise that particular,
egregious practices or cases may be remedied under the Charter,but this
sidesteps the issue of legal accountability for administrative design.
Interestingly, in Little Sisters, Justice Iacobucci, in dissent, addressed the
administrative design question directly. He was no more prepared than
Justice Binnie to subject the administrative preferences of the Government
to judicial scrutiny, but because in his view declaratory remedies were
inadequate to deal with the systemic flaws in the administration of
obscenity seizures, Justice Iacobucci was prepared to strike down the
legislation, and require the government to redesign the administration of
the CustomsAct to include greater procedural safeguards and to leave the

11 9

Supra note 96.
120 (1999), 178 D.L.R. (4th) 181 [Glasgow].This case and its implications are discussed
further in
Pottie & Sossin, supra note 1.
121 Glasgow,ibid.at 188-91. The policy was invalidated by the court on other grounds, namely that
by placing a direct obligation on applicants, the policy went beyond that which is properly the subject
of a guideline as opposed to legislation or regulations, and in authorizing the Department to gather
information irrelevant to a determination of eligibility (such as employee work habits, behaviour as a
tenant, or health information), the policy was invalid as a breach of procedural fairness.
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1 22
determination of obscenity to a more quasi-judicial process.
The relationship between public law accountability and public
administration in Canada is complex and not always consistently defined by
courts. The preponderance of precedent would appear to suggest an uphill
climb for a litigant seeking a judicial remedy for having been denied
benefits due to the maladministration of a call centre or the excessive
document requests of the verification process. However, in my view, as
elaborated above, there is simply no principled basis on which to exclude
judicial review for bureaucratic disentitlement in the welfare system due to
administrative design or a service delivery model.

2.

Discretionary Justice in an Era of Privatized Welfare

Having set out what an approach to discretionary justice might look
like in the face of the realities of welfare administration, the question
remains how resilient this form of accountability will be when confronted
with the increasing trend toward contracting out welfare administration.
Because the phenomenon of contracting out welfare administration is far
more widespread in the United States than Canada, most of the literature
on this subject arises from American settings. There are signs, however, that
123
as in so many other social assistance settings (devolution, workfare, etc.),
the American influence on the development of welfare administration in
Canada may be significant. Indeed, the "Business Transformation Project"
initiated by the Ontario Ministry of Community, Family, and Children's
Services, which ushered in the new SDM, was itself an important experiment
in contracting out. Andersen (now Accenture), a management consulting
firm, designed and managed the new system for welfare, and shared in the
"savings" which accrued to government through more efficient use of
technology and, of course, through a reduced welfare caseload. 24 While
there are many perspectives from which to analyze contracting out social
services, I wish to emphasize the question of legal accountability for forms
122 Little Sisters, supra note 115 at 1251-54.
123 See Peck, supra note 11 at 215.
124

For a detailed discussion of the contracting out process, see Art Daniels & Bonnie Ewart,
"Transforming Ontario's Social Assistance Delivery System" (2000) 1 CanadianGovernmentExecutive
26. The contract with Accenture was worth around $180 million. This included fees for service and
certain arrangements entitled to permit Accenture to share in the Government's savings. The Provincial
Auditor was highly critical of the government's statement of the benefits of the BTP, and therefore of
the compensation which Accenture was receiving. See Ontario, Provincial Auditor, SpecialReport,supra
note 64 at 258-66 and Ontario, Provincial Auditor, Annual Report (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1998) at
31-56, online: <http://www.auditor.on.ca/english/reports/e98/301.pdf>. For discussion, see Borins,supra
note 16 at 43-46.
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of administering social assistance services. The issue is essentially whether,
and in what circumstances, administrative law duties may be owed by
private firms delivering welfare services. The discussion below canvasses
both American and Canadian approaches to addressing this question.
a.

The American experience

The American approach to the question of legal accountability for
welfare administration has focused, of late, on the sweeping trend to
privatize welfare administration at the state level. This trend encompasses
"contracting, vouchers, subsidies, franchises, and tax credits, to more
extreme forms such as load-shedding, in which the government eliminates
its role in certain areas by selling its assets to the private sector or
withdrawing from providing a service altogether. "'2' The most common
126
form of American privatization is contracting out service provision.
Welfare privatization contracts can encompass the entire caseload (as in
Milwaukee) or job development programs only (as in Arizona).12 7 In this
context, there is clearly no single way to ensure legal accountability. Even
if there were a cohesive approach to privatization, the legal landscape
would remain muddled. As Gilman says: "At present, in a privatized
welfare jurisdiction, there is simply no reliable, unified theory for enforcing
procedural norms. Just as the welfare system128has been decentralized and
devolved, so will be the law that governs it."'
The glue that once bound welfare rights-that social assistance was
a statutory entitlement-has lost its hold. As discussed above, in 1970,
Goldberg1 29 established that welfare benefits were an entitlement. Such
status conferred property rights upon "persons qualified to receive
[benefits]., 130 This led to a variety of decisions implicating the welfare

125 See Michele Estrin Gilman, "Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare" (2001) 89
Cal. L. Rev. 569 at 594 [footnote omitted]. See also Jon Michaels, "Deforming Welfare: How the
Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform," (2004) 34
Seton Hall L. Rev. 573.
126 See Gilman, ibid. at 594. See also Dru Stevenson, "Privatization of Welfare Services:
Delegation by Commercial Contract" (2003) 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 83 at 105-115.
127See Gilman, supra note 125 at 592.
128 Ibid. at 625.
129 Supra note 72.
130 See Gilman, ibid. at 604; Kennedy, supra note 75 at 239-42. This implies that not only recipients
but also qualified applicants enjoyed entitlement status.
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system, including Perezv. Lavine, 1"' inwhich New York Social Services were

ordered to revise their administrative procedures to ensure that applicants
could pick up application forms within a reasonable time. Twenty-six years
later, the PersonalResponsibility and Work Opportunity ReconciliationAct
(PRWORA) 13 2 changed

the nature of welfare administration in America. The

states unequivocally that it "shall not be interpreted to entitle any
individual or family to assistance under any State program funded under
[the Act]."' 33 This language effectively passes the onus of allowing an
entitlement to the states, some
of which statutorily deny an entitlement,
34
some of which reserve one.
There remains a school of thought that contends that even under
the new regime of devolved and decentralized social assistance, a core
entitlement persists. 35 Indeed, Gilman asserts that "most scholars... as well
as the only two courts to address it, have concluded that TANF [Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families, the welfare program created by the PRWORA]
benefits are still entitlements."'' 36 The content of the PRwORA-the granting
of economic assistance to qualified applicants-suggests that the benefits
remain an entitlement irrespective of how the legislature characterizes the
PRWORA

benefits.

37

Furthermore, to some it appears that Congress's intent was not

to remove due process protection, but to emphasize the temporariness of
the benefits.'38
The most important public law doctrine in the context of
accountability for welfare privatization would appear to be that of "state
action." In order for a welfare provider to be covered by the due process
131 412 F. Supp. 1340 at 1356-7 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
132 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). This
Act changed the relationship between the federal government and the states from an entitlement based
grant to a conditional block grant to provide for temporary social benefits to those in need (initially
limited to a 5 year term).
133 Ibid. § 601(b).
134 See Gilman, supra note 125 at 606. For a case exploring the extent of statutory obligation
in
relation to welfare administration, see Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 at 344-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1999), modified 43 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). See also Alice Bers, "Reforming Welfare after
Welfare Reform: Reynolds v. Giuliani 118 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)" (2001) 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 571.
135 Ibid. See also Kennedy, supra note 75 at 281-88.
136 supra note 125 at 606 [footnotes omitted].
137 Ibid. at 606-07. See also Kennedy, supra note 75 at
282.
138 See Gilman, supra note 125 at 607. See also Michelle VanWiggeren, "Experimenting
with
Block Grants and Temporary Assistance: The Attempt to Transform Welfare by Altering Federal State
Relations and Recipients' Due Process Rights" (1997) 46 Emory L.J. 1327 at 1359-61.
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obligations under the American Constitution, it is first necessary to
establish that it is a state actor. InLugarv.Edmondson Oil Co.,"' the Court
established the test to determine when a private actor can be characterized
as a state actor. The test is two-pronged: (1) the "nexus" analysis, that is,
the degree of state involvement in the action and (2) the "public function"
analysis, that is, whether a public function is being carried out." 0 In the
context of social services privatization, the two leading cases are Blum v.
Yaretsky14 ' and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn. t42 In each case, the Court held that
the private actor's discretionary power was sufficiently independent of any
public funding or regulation administered by the state to be free of public
law obligations.
In Rendell-Baker, the Court stated that in order to satisfy the "public
function" analysis the impugned action must have been "traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the state., 143 In this instance, private school
employees were held to not be state actors because school districts had the
option of providing educational services publicly or privately. Gilman notes
that this is a self-defeating proposition-any service that has the option of
being privatized is therefore not "the exclusive prerogative of the state. ' 44
This is just one of several critiques of the state action test. 45 There are
prospects of change however-some lower courts have recently found
private conduct
to constitute state action in other contexts, such as in
prisons.' 46
In addition to the state action issue, another dynamic of legal
accountability for privatized welfare in the United States is the nondelegable duty. This theory holds that there are certain functions that
government must itself perform. The concern is that delegates will act in

139 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
140 See Gilman, supra note 125 at 611-12
141 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
142 457 U.S. 830 (1982) [Rendell-Baker].
143 Ibid. at

849.

14 4

Supra note 125 at 614.
14 5
Ibid. at 614-21. Other problems include a misplaced focus on the state's intent, and a misplaced
focus on the actor as opposed to the conduct. See also Henry Freedman etal., "Uncharted Terrain: The
Intersection of Privatization and Welfare" (2002) 35 Clearinghouse Rev. 557.
146See Jody Freeman, "Extending Public Law Norms through Privatization" (2003) 116 Harv. L.
Rev. 1285 at 1319. A further problem with state action is that of qualified immunity. If a private
provider is found to be a state actor, they might claim immunity "insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." See Gilman, supra note 125 at 624 quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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their own interests, whereas (theoretically) government would not. 47 Nondelegable duty is rarely successful when challenging a delegation to another
branch or level of government. 8 Some functions are already non-delegable,
like elections and municipal government, and as privatization becomes
more common it is reasonable to expect that this list could grow. 4 9 The
Texas Supreme Court has said that they "believe it axiomatic that courts
should subject private delegations to a more searching scrutiny than their
public counterparts."' 50 The Seventh Circuit federal appeals court recently
distinguished between the delegation of legislative-type power, which is
usually acceptable, and the delegation of judicial-type power, which is
not. 151 Stevenson contends that welfare eligibility determinations would be
a judicial function, and hence contestable. 5 2 However, he admits that "the
line between legislative and adjudicative functions is sometimes blurred."15 3
A third public law doctrine is that of due process. Prior to the
enactment of the PRWORA, Kennedy notes that there were three primary
elements of due process owed to welfare claimants: the right to apply and
receive; the right to fair notice, and; the right to be heard.'5 4 Kennedy
concedes that poor administration or even incompetence on its own would
be an insufficient basis for an action claiming a violation of the right to
apply and receive welfare. 55 However, he asserts that "administrative
dissuasion, onerous application or receipt procedures, and bureaucratic
disentitlement" all may be valid grounds. 56 Kennedy's main concern with
respect to the right to fair notice is in regards to the EBT (Electronic Benefit
Transfer) system of welfare benefit distribution.'5 7 Most electronic fund
transfers are governed by Regulation E, which, pursuant to the Electronic
Fund TransferAct (EFTA), 15 8 establishes a set of procedures for fair notice
147 See Stevenson, supra note 126 at 98-99.
148 Ibid. at 94-95.
149 See Freeman, supra note 146 at 1318.
150See Stevenson, supra note 126 at 97 (quoting Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc.v.
Lewellyn, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997) at 472).
151Ibid at 99-100 (discussing Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski, 208 F. 3d 615 (7th
Cir. 2000).
152 Ibid. at 100.
153 Ibid.
154 Supra note 75 at 286-87.
155 Ibid. at 293.
56

Ibid.

157 Ibid. at 295-300.
158 15 U.S.C. § 1693-1693r (1996).
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and resolution of errors and liability questions. Although EBT transactions
fit the definition of fund transfers set out in the EFTA they are not covered
by Regulation E, which leaves welfare recipients with substantially weaker
due process guarantees than those enjoyed by ATM users.15 9 While the
PRWORA may have removed the statutory right to a hearing, Kennedy argues
that because private welfare providers have a financial interest, even a
fiduciary duty (that is, to maximize shareholder value), to disentitle as many
recipients as possible, the right to a fair hearing is more important than
160
ever.
The absence of a statutory right of action under the PRWORA makes
federal suits seeking to impose due process requirements unlikely to
succeed. At the state level, one alternative is the APA (Administrative
Procedure Acts), which "provide standing to statutory beneficiaries to
enforce agency accountability." 161 However, this again requires establishing
that the privatizer is a state actor; historically, this has been a difficult
hurdle to meet in the context of the APA. 162 Another state-level alternative
is to invoke the doctrine of mandamus. This is a common law method to
"compel performance of statutory duties., 163 Mandamus is, however, rarely
used; it is ineffective against the use of discretion and, like other means of
holding private welfare providers accountable, it requires the establishment
of state action. 164
Not all forms of legal accountability under public law involve
judicial review on administrative or constitutional grounds. Private law
doctrines also offer potential grounds for legal accountability. Litigants may
bring estoppel claims against private welfare service providers, for example,
where a welfare recipient suffers personal injury as a result of
maladministration or improper disentitlement. However, government
actors are generally immune from tort claims. In Schweiker v. Hansen165 the
U.S. Supreme Court refused an estoppel claim brought against an employee
at a Social Security office who had mistakenly denied a claimant's benefits.
The Court ruled that government actors could be liable in tort only in cases
involving blatant misconduct, or where the public interest is overwhelmed
159

Supra note 75 at 295.

160

Supra note 75 at 301-05.

161 See Gilman, supra note 125 at 633 [footnote omitted].
1 62

Ibid. See also Freeman, supranote 146 at 1305 [footnotes omitted].

163 See Gilman, supra note 125 at 634 [footnote omitted].
164 Ibid.
165 450 U.S. 785 (1981).
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by the gravity of the private injury.166
Cumulatively, these various legal strategies represent important but
limited forms of accountability. Certainly, privatized welfare administration
is subject to far less judicial scrutiny in the United States than public
welfare administration-and this of course is one of the most persuasive
arguments for privatization. The view that "welfare rights" have become a
barrier to progressive change-to "ending welfare"-has significant
resonance in American policy circles. Canadian public law has not been
marked by a welfare rights tradition, as discussed above, and initiatives to
outsource or privatize the delivery and administration of social services
have been tentative and mostly at the margins to this point.167 The Ontario
experience with the Business Transformation Project and its reliance on
private management consultants to redesign welfare administration is
arguably a harbinger of greater private involvement in the delivery of
welfare. The time is thus ripe for a consideration of the principles which
should animate the legal accountability for system design in the welfare
context.
b.

The Canadian experience

In light of the limitations of Canadian public law in the face of
bureaucratic disentitlement at a systemic level, legal accountability for the
privatization of welfare administration would appear at first glance to be
minimal. In this analysis, I have suggested that legal accountability should
be strengthened, and that this accountability should be tied to core
principles relating to discretionary justice. The foremost of these principles
would be: (1) that any aspect of the discretionary decision-making process
that has a significant bearing on the process and outcome of applying
statutory authority should be subject to legal accountability. At a minimum,
this principle would mean that standards of fairness and reasonableness
apply to administrative designs. To this principle, I would add two others
which address the possibility of privatized welfare administration: (2)
government cannot contract out of legal accountability for welfare design
by delegating or outsourcing specific aspects of the decision-making
166 See Gilman, supra note 125 at 639-40.
167 One exception to this assertion relates to the delivery of children's and developmental social
services, which has a long history of being publicly funded but administered and delivered by private
(albeit non-profit) institutions. For discussion, see Lorne Sossin, "Dilemmas of Evaluation,
Accountability and Politics: Contracting Out Social Services in Ontario" (Research Paper Series No.
40, Report to the Panel on the Role of Government, October 2003), online: <http:/Avww.lawlib.utoronto.ca/investing/reports/rp40.pdf>.
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process; and (3) legal accountability should be undertaken in the forum
most likely to lead to effective monitoring, enforcement and remedies
against bureaucratic disentitlement. Having spent much of this article
elaborating on the first principle, I would like to conclude with a brief word
on the second and third principles, in the hope that this might be taken as
a point of departure for further reflection and research.
What is the relevance of public law principles in the face of
privatized social assistance delivery? The reach of public law in Canada in
8
the face of privatization and deregulation is at best uncertain.'
Constitutional law may be used to ensure that the government does not
abdicate its constitutional responsibilities through having private entities
deliver publicly funded services. As a matter of constitutional law in
Canada, the Supreme Court has concluded that at least some social services
are inherently governmental irrespective of who delivers them. This issue
was addressed, in a roundabout way, by the Court in Eldridge v. British
Columbia (Attorney General).69
' In Eldridge, the matter before the Court
was whether a clinic had violated the equality rights under the Charterof
Rights by failing to provide translation services for a deaf woman receiving
medical services at the clinic. In order for the Charterto apply, the Court
first had to conclude that the clinic's activities constituted "government
action" under section 32 of the Charter.70
In the course of concluding that the Charterdid apply, Justice La
Forest, writing for the Court, noted that "[t]here are myriad public or quasipublic institutions that may be independent from government in some
respects, but in other respects may exercise delegated governmental powers
or be otherwise responsible for the implementation of government
policy.' 7 ' Accordingly, Justice La Forest concluded that "a private entity
may be subject to the Charterin respect of certain inherently governmental
actions," 172 and therefore the fact that the provider of health services in that
case was a private clinic did not alter the fact that its decisions were
"governmental actions."
Having addressed the issue of whether the government's
responsibility for fairness and reasonableness in the design of welfare
168 See David Mullan & Antonella Ceddia, "The Impact on Public Law of Privatization,
Deregulation,Outsourcing,andDownsizing:A CanadianPerspective" (2003) 10 nd.J. Global Legal Stud.
199.
169 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 [Eldridge].
170 Ibid. at 643.
171 Ibid. at 655.

172 Ibid. at 659.
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eligibility could be contracted out, I now turn briefly to an elaboration of
the third principle, that legal accountability should be undertaken in the
forum most likely to lead to effective monitoring, enforcement and
remedies against bureaucratic disentitlement.
It is clear that traditional forms of judicial review represent a poor
forum of legal oversight for the administrative design of social assistance
delivery. They require time, knowledge and resources which social
assistance applicants and recipients do not have in great supply. While I
have argued public law principles ought to impose standards of fairness and
reasonableness on welfare administration, it is important to keep an open
mind as to the diverse forms of public investigations and reviews which
might achieve this accountability. Below, I canvass a few such options,
including the Ombudsman, the Provincial Auditor, inquests and public
inquiries, and judicial intervention through, among other litigation
strategies, class actions on behalf of welfare recipients or applicants.
c.

The Ombudsman

The Ombudsman's office has jurisdiction over accountability for the
delivery of public services. Section 14(1) of the Ontario Ombudsman Act
provides that:
The function of the Ombudsman is to investigate any decision or recommendation made or
any act done or omitted in the course of the administration of a governmental organization
73
and affecting any person or body of persons in his, her or its personal capacity.

While most complaints to the Ombudsman relate to individual
decisions, this does present an opportunity to bring public scrutiny to the
relationship between individual outcomes and systemic disentitlement
practices. Recently, the Advocacy Clinic for Tenants made a submission to
the Ombudsman outlining systemic concerns with the Ontario Rental
Housing SBT. The Income Security Advocacy Centre has made a similar
submission with respect to the Social Benefits SBT. While this option holds
out significant promise in exposing bureaucratic disentitlement practices,
the Ombudsman has no power to enforce any recommendations made.'74

173 R.S.O. 1990, c. 0-6.
174 For discussion, see Mary A. Marshall & Linda C. Reif, "The Ombudsman: Maladministration
and Alternative Dispute Resolution (1995) 34:1 Alta L. Rev. 215. Marshall and Reif have
recommended that the Ombudsman's supervisory role over the administration of public services should
continue, even as the delivery of these services is privatized or devolved to local or regional bodies (ibid.
at 224).
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d.

The Provincial Auditor

A similarly independent legislative officer with an oversight
jurisdiction over the administrative design of government services is the
Provincial Auditor. As noted earlier, the Provincial Auditor in Ontario has
been active in bringing independent public scrutiny to bear on the Business
Transformation Project which ushered in Ontario's new Service Delivery
Model. Typically, however, the auditor's review relates to the expenditure
of public funds rather than compliance with public law obligations. And
here again, the Auditor has no remedial authority beyond reporting on
mismanagement or maladministration to the Legislature.
e.

Inquests and inquiries

Another public body which may have a mandate to investigate the
government's obligations in relation to welfare eligibility is a Coroner's
inquest or public inquiry. While inquests and inquiries are fact-finding
bodies, they have extensive powers to compel documentary evidence and
oral testimony and may be an effective forum to bring about public
accountability. The Coroner's Inquest into the death of Kimberly Rogers,
(who died during a heat wave inside her apartment while eight months
pregnant and under house arrest for welfare fraud), is a good example.
Standing was granted to a coalition of poverty-related advocacy groups who
sought to ensure that the Inquest focused on the plight of women in
Rogers' shoes, in addition to investigating the causes of her death. The
recommendations of the Coroner's Jury were wide-ranging and included
calls for more discretion afforded to local welfare officials to provide
emergency assistance, eliminating the lifetime welfare ban and reviewing
the adequacy of welfare benefits.175
From the standpoint of public accountability there are a number of
problems with inquests and inquiries as well. They cannot be initiated by
affected parties. They also result only in non-binding recommendations.
Finally, they tend to be retrospective investigations, brought about by
individually tragic circumstances, and are unlikely to lead to significant
administrative reform.

175 See

"Verdict

of

Coroner's

Jury,"

<http://dawn.thot.net/KimberlyRogers/kria118.html>.
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Judicial intervention
While courts, as noted several times above, do not represent the

only means of ensuring public accountability for discretionary justice, they
remain an important catalyst for this process, both because of the
extraordinary remedial powers of the court and its moral authority, and
because of the media attention which court challenges tend to bring. 176 The

route to court for disputes over welfare eligibility in Ontario typically begins
with an individual decision of ineligibility which is then contested, often
with the involvement of legal aid counsel, before the Social Benefit SBT.

Only then can an application for judicial review be made to the Divisional
Court. For the reasons outlined above, this circuitous process rarely puts
questions of bureaucratic disentitlement before the court (if for no other
reason than people who give up on the application process or are

discouraged from entering it have no "decision of ineligibility" to object to).
As I have discussed, I believe Charter and administrative law doctrines
could and should apply more effectively to bureaucratic disentitlement.
There are, however, other options for judicial intervention in the welfare
system.
One such option might include a class action against the Crown
alleging misuse of public authority, breach of fiduciary obligation or an
assortment of other civil wrongs applicable to public bodies. 77 A class
action could seek damages equal to lost or forfeited benefits of a class of
applicants or recipients or simply a declaration setting out the obligations
of Government in relation to the administrative design of welfare eligibility.
The benefits of a class action include fuller coverage of people who are
affected but might never complain, and the ability to place scrutiny on
176

To take just one example, judicial review had a significant impact on the administrative process
for determining when two people are "spouses" for the purpose of welfare benefits. The Regulation
defining "spouses" under the Act permitted two roommates who shared expenses, or two people just
starting out in a relationship to be deemed spouses, and therefore to have their benefits reduced. This
Regulation was struck down by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Falkiner(supra note 114). In the course
of its reasons, the Court also indicated that an intrusive questionnaire used by welfare officials intruded
on the privacy and undermined the dignity of welfare applicants. While the Court's order did not extend
to the administrative process, when the Regulation was redrafted, a new questionnaire and
administrative directive accompanied it, significantly reducing the intrusive questions and intimate
nature of the information applicants had to provide.
177 For discussion of these obligations and the recent rise in class actions,
see Lome Sossin,
"Public Fiduciary Obligations, Political Trusts and the Evolving Duty of Reasonableness in
Administrative Law" (2003) 66 Sask. L. Rev. 129. In Authorson v. Canada, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40, the
Supreme Court recognized the application of a Crown fiduciary obligation in the context of a social
benefit, although denied relief to the class of disabled veterans on the grounds of a statutory bar to such
relief.
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systemic practices affecting a large number of people rather than individual
decisions. The downside of such an approach, of course, would be the uphill
climb to establish the breach of the Crown's legal obligations. Because this
would be a civil action rather than a judicial review of administrative
decision-making, the doctrines at issue would not be those of procedural
fairness or reasonableness, but rather doctrines intended to impose liability
for egregious wrongdoing. Establishing that general administrative practices
constitute specific breaches of equitable or civil obligations is a tall order.
Thus, while options such as class actions, inquests, auditor reviews,
and complaints to the Ombudsman have potential to be accessible and
effective mechanisms to secure greater public accountability, there is no
one method that strikes the perfect balance. The modalities of public
accountability suggest the need for innovation and creative legal thinking.
What is clear, in my view, is the need for a principled and practical legal
response to the phenomenon of bureaucratic disentitlement. This takes me
back to where I began, with the question of law's role in welfare
administration. I have suggested that the role of law in the realm of welfare
administration is no different than its role in other settings of administrative
decision-making, that is, to ensure respect for the rule of law and human
dignity through mechanisms that guarantee the fairness and reasonableness
of exercises of public authority.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Ontario Government has claimed success in its Business
Transformation Project. The number of people receiving welfare in Ontario
has been substantially reduced (whether for reasons of fraud prevention,
disentitlement or economic growth is unclear, just as is the question of
where people who "leave" welfare actually go). However, as an American
observer notes, "[flocusing exclusively on the number of recipients no
longer receiving welfare ignores numerous unresolved philosophical,
political, social, and legal questions accompanying this sweeping overhaul
of the welfare system.' ' 78 I have focused on one such unresolved legal
question, involving the reach of public law into the recesses of public
administration. I have concluded that it is both possible and necessary to
subject this largely uncharted terrain of public authority over vulnerable
people to public scrutiny and legal standards.
To summarize, I have argued that the exercise of discretion with
respect to administrative design in determining eligibility for social
178 Christine N. Cimini, "The New Contract: Welfare Reform, Devolution and Due Process"
(2002) 61 Md. L. Rev. 246 at 248.
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assistance should be subject to public law obligations of fairness and
reasonableness, and that these obligations arise from public law concerns
that the exercise of public authority conforms to fundamental process
values such as protecting human dignity. More broadly, I have contended
that concerns over legality are difficult to disentangle from concerns over
values when it comes to how the state responds to the needs of vulnerable
people, especially those dependent on state assistance for their survival.
Bureaucratic disentitlement is not only unfair and unreasonable, it is also
unsavoury, invidious, and oppressive. If the rule of law is to amount to more
than a set of hollow and formal guarantees, it must extend to service
delivery models just as it does to social benefit tribunals. In other words,
discretionary justice is not simply a matter of the judgments individual
officials make but must also be a question of the structures through which
those judgments are mediated. If administrative discretion is mediated
through call centres, intake scripts and database fields, then public law
obligations must, in my view, follow.

